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Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing
Abstract
The basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vibrant ux. The purely rational approach
is being subsumed by a broader approach based upon the psychology of investors. In
this approach, security expected returns are determined by both risk and misvaluation.
This survey sketches a framework for understanding decision biases, evaluates the a
priori arguments and the capital market evidence bearing on the importance of investor
psychology for security prices, and reviews recent models.
The best plan is : : : to prot by the folly of others.
| Pliny the Elder, from John Bartlett, comp. Familiar Quotations, 9th ed. 1901.
In the muddled days before the rise of modern nance, some otherwise-reputable
economists, such as Adam Smith, Irving Fisher, John Maynard Keynes, and Harry
Markowitz, thought that individual psychology aects prices.
1
What if the creators of
asset pricing theory had followed this thread? Picture a school of sociologists at the Uni-
versity of Chicago proposing the Decient Markets Hypothesis: that prices inaccurately
reect all available information. A brilliant Stanford psychologist, call him Bill Blunte,
invents the Deranged Anticipation and Perception Model (or DAPM), in which prox-
ies for market misvaluation are used to predict security returns. Imagine the euphoria
when researchers discovered that these mispricing proxies (such as book/market, earn-
ings/price, and past returns), and mood indicators such as amount of sunlight, turned
out to be strong predictors of future returns. At this point, it would seem that the
decient markets hypothesis was the best-conrmed theory in the social sciences.
To be sure, dissatised practitioners would have complained that it is harder to actu-
ally make money than ivory tower theorists claim. One can even imagine some academic
heretics documenting rapid short-term stock market responses to news arrival in event
studies, and arguing that security return predictability results from rational premia for
bearing risk. Would the old guard surrender easily? Not when they could appeal to in-
tertemporal versions of the DAPM, in which mispricing is only corrected slowly. In such
a setting, short-window event studies cannot uncover the market's ineÆcient response to
new information. More generally, given the strong theoretical underpinnings of market
ineÆciency, the rebels would probably have an uphill ght.
This alternative history suggests that the traditional view that nancial economists
have had about the rationality of asset prices was not as inevitable as it may seem.
Despite many empirical studies, scholarly viewpoints on the rationality of asset pricing
have not converged. This is probably a result of strong prior beliefs on both sides. On
one side, strong priors are reected in the methodological claim that we should adhere to
1
Smith analyzed how the `overweening conceit' of mankind caused labor to be underpriced in more
enterprising pursuits. Young workers do not arbitrage away pay dierentials because they are prone
to overestimate their ability to succeed. Fisher wrote a book on money illusion; in The Theory of
Interest ((1930), ch. 21, pp. 493-94) he argued that nominal interest rates systematically fail to adjust
suÆciently for ination, and explained savings behavior in relation to self-control, foresight, and habits.
Keynes (1936) famously commented on animal spirits in stock markets. Markowitz (1952) proposed
that people focus on gains and losses relative to reference points, and that this helps explain the pricing
of insurance and lotteries.
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rational explanations unless the evidence compels rejection; and in the use of the term
`risk premium' interchangeably with `mean return in excess of the riskfree rate'. For
those on the opposite side, risk often comes quite late in the list of possible explanations
for return predictability.
Often advocates of one approach or the other have cast the rst stone out the door of
their own glass house. There is in fact a notable parallelism among objections to the two
approaches, illustrated in corresponding fashion in Table 1. (Lining up each objection
with its counterpart does not imply parity in the validity of the arguments.)
This survey assesses the theory and evidence regarding investor psychology as a
determinant of asset prices. This issue is at the heart of a grand debate in nance
spanning the last two decades. In the last few years, nancial economists have grown
more receptive to imperfect rational explanations. Over time I believe that the purely
rational paradigm will be subsumed by a broader psychological paradigm that includes
full rationality as a signicant special case.
Two superb recent presentations of the asset pricing eld (Campbell (2000), Cochrane
(2000)) emphasize objective external sources of risk. As Campbell puts it, \... asset
pricing is concerned with the sources of risk and the economic forces that determine the
rewards for bearing risk." For Cochrane, \The central task of nancial economics is to
gure out what are the real risks that drive asset prices and expected returns."
In contrast, I argue here that the central task of asset pricing is to examine how
expected returns are related to risk and to investor misvaluation. Campbell's survey
emphasizes the stability of the nance paradigm over the last two decades. I will argue
that the basic paradigm of asset pricing is in vigorous and productive ux.
Figure 1 illustrates static asset pricing (analogous to the CAPM) when investors
misvalue assets and securities. Returns are increasing with risk (measured here by
CAPM beta) and with current market undervaluation of the asset. There are several
potential noisy proxies for the degree of underpricing, such as price-containing variables
(e.g., book/market, market value, earnings/price), measures of public mood (e.g., the
weather), or actions possibly taken to exploit mispricing (e.g., recent occurence of a
stock repurchase, insider purchases). Risk and mispricing eects do not necessarily take
such a simple linearly separable form (see the models described in Section IV), but it is
still useful to keep the two notions conceptually distinct.
This picture is only a starting point. Just as the static risk eects of the CAPM have
been generalized to intertemporal asset pricing, so the dynamic behavior of mispricing
must be accounted for as well. After decades of study, the sources of risk premia in purely
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rational dynamic models are well understood. In contrast, dynamic psychology-based
asset pricing theory is in its infancy.
In the remainder of the introduction, I discuss market forces that can maintain or
to eliminate mispricing, and why we cannot dismiss mispricing on conceptual grounds.
Section I of the survey presents relevant psychological biases, and argue that many of
the important biases grow naturally from just a few deep roots. Section II summa-
rizes evidence on capital market and investor behavior regarding the importance of risk
and misvaluation eects. Section III presents asset pricing theories based on imperfect
rationality. Section IV concludes with further directions for research.
To think about whether mispricing is viable, consider the traditional argument for
rational price-setting. In this account, smart traders spot dollar bills lying on the ground
and grab them, which does away with mispricing. Setting aside the dynamics of wealth
momentarily, the arbitrage story is incomplete in two ways. First, equilibrium prices
reect a weighted average of the beliefs of the rational and irrational traders.
2
So long
as each group has signicant risk-bearing capacity, both inuence prices signicantly.
Arbitrage is a double-edged blade: just as rational investors arbitrage away ineÆcient
pricing, foolish traders arbitrage away eÆcient pricing. Second, in some respects all
investors may be imperfectly rational. Even in the Olympics, no one runs at the speed
of light; some cognitive tasks are too hard for any of us.
The traditional argument further asserts that wealth ows from foolish to wise in-
vestors. This point carries considerable weight. Suppose that some rational individuals
are immune from bias, and that all markets are liquid. Suppose that terminal dividends
obey a linear factor model with K systematic and N idiosyncratic payo components (I
will call these systematic and idioysyncratic `factors'). An irrational investor on average
trades and loses on every factor that he misvalues. If the number of factors N + K is
large, and if a nontrivial fraction of them are substantially mispriced, then on average
irrational investors lose a very large amount of money almost surely. Soon superior
rationality will prevail.
Thus, as long as some investors are rational and markets are perfect, there can be
substantial mispricing in only a small fraction of the N + K factors. If N >> K,
then some or all of the systematic factors can be substantially mispriced, but only a
small fraction of the N idiosyncratic components can be (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (2001a)).
2
See, e.g., Campbell and Kyle (1993), DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a), Figlewski
(1978), Shefrin and Statman (1994), and Shiller (1984).
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On the other hand, people are likely to be more prone to bias in valuing securities
for which information is sparse. This suggests that misperceptions are strongest in the
dusty, idiosyncratic corners of the market place. One way to reconcile both intuitions
is to recognize that there are biases that almost noone is immune to. In this case there
can be widespread idiosyncratic mispricing which only becomes apparent ex post.
Although misperceptions are probably most severe when information is sparse and ar-
rives slowly, there is no reason to think that confusion is conned purely to idiosyncratic
factors. Market timers trade based on what they perceive to be superior information
about the market or about industry plays such as high-tech. Investors (whether wisely
or not) purchase macroeconomic forecasts. So if investors sometimes misinterpret infor-
mation, they will make systematic as well as idiosyncratic errors. Indeed, to the extent
that misperceptions are conveyed through social processes, mistakes may be greatest for
systematic factors along with a few well-known securities.
The fact that several empirical patterns of predictability are strongest in small (pre-
sumably less liquid) rms suggests that illiquid markets may be less eÆcient. This is
less obvious than it sounds|the ndings may result from the sparser information avail-
able about small, illiquid rms. Since arbitrage is double-edged, holding wealth constant
there is no presumption that liquidity immediately reduces mispricing. It does, however,
speed the ow of wealth between between smart and foolish traders, which may in the
long run do so.
3
It is often suggested that the expertise of hedge funds or investment banks will
improve arbitrage enough to eliminate any signicant mispricing. This works if foolish
investors are wise enough to delegate to sound managers. However, intermediaries have
incentives to serve or exploit the irrationalities of potential clients. It is not obvious
that layering agency over folly improves decisions.
4
So misvaluation does not require
that there be frictions or special impediments to fund-raising by smart players. Such
frictions, however, can slow the ow of wealth between smart and foolish smart traders,
perhaps allowing mispricing to persist longer.
When substantial mispricing is limited to a few factors and residuals, less rational
3
Liquidity makes it easier for smart traders to arbitrage away mispricing, but also easier for foolish
traders to arbitrage away eÆcient pricing. Barber and Odean (1999) nd that traders who switch
to online brokerages trade more aggressively yet subsequently perform poorly|their greater liquidity
encouraged bad trades.
4
Furthermore, regardless of whether there are intermediaries, it is exactly when a security or sector
becomes more mispriced that smarter investors become poorer. This weakens rational arbitrage (and
strengthens irrational anti-arbitrage) in an untimely way (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Kyle and Xiong
(2000)).
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investors do not necessarily lose on average to wiser ones. Investors who underestimate
risk take larger long positions in risky assets, and thereby achieve higher expected re-
turns (DeLong et al (1990a, 1991)). It could further be argued that trading pressure
by irrational investors induces cross-sectional return predictability; that these investors
thereby lose money; but that on average they make up their losses by bearing more
aggregate market risk. However, if overcondent investors irrationally overbuy the mar-
ket, this should result in a low expected return. This does not jibe well with the equity
premium puzzle of Mehra and Prescott (1985).
There are other means by which imperfectly rational individuals can earn high ex-
pected returns. Overcondent investors who buy and sell aggressively in response to
valid private information signals may exploit liquidity traders more protably than ra-
tional investors (Hirshleifer and Luo (2001)). In an imperfectly competitive securities
market, overcondent traders can benet by intimidating competing informed traders
(Kyle and Wang (1997)).
5
Overcondent individuals are also likely to overinvest in
acquiring private information, at the expense of leisure.
6
However, what evidence we have suggests that aggressively trading individual in-
vestors do badly.
7
Despite the ingenious explanations for protable foolishness, it is
quite plausible that in fact fools and their money are soon parted. Even if so, a misper-
ception that derives from a fundamental human psychological trait can remain important
for asset prices in the long term. There are two related reasons.
First, wealth is reshued in the process of generational succession. Second, in the
process of getting rich, individuals can learn to be less rational. For example, biased self-
attribution (Section I.2) causes individuals to attribute successes to their own qualities
and failures to chance. As a result, losses by overcondent individuals can be oset by
the rising condence of the nouveau riche (see Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam
(1998), Gervais and Odean (2001)).
It is challenging to nd a source of risk to explain rationally the magnitude of cross-
sectional predictability (see Section II). The challenge for the mispricing theory is to
explain how irrational investors can remain important while hemorrhaging a great deal
of cash. The disappearance of the size eect in the mid-1980s and the inconsistency of
5
See also Benos (1998), Fischer and Verrecchia (1999), and Wang (1998)).
6
Other means by which the imperfectly rational can do well or poorly have been described as well;
see Blume and Easley (1982, 1990, 2000), Palomino (1996), Luo (1998), and Sandroni (2000).
7
See Barber and Odean (1999, 2000a, 2000b) and Odean (1999). However, most of the theoretical
models imply that only investors with moderate overcondence will do well. The data may be picking
up the poor performance of the extremely overcondent.
5
the value eect in the last few years is suggestive.
8
There is a further problem. Having detected a return pattern statistically, it is hard
for an investor to know whether other investors have yet detected and acted upon it. In
1984, how could an investor be sure whether other investors were overexploiting the size
eect (Daniel and Titman (1999))? This uncertainty suggests that sometimes patterns of
mispricing will be arbitraged away too slowly, and other times will overshoot. Conceiv-
ably the long life of the momentum eect has resulted from arbitrageurs each mistakenly
fearing that others have started to trade aggressively. As Yogi Berra commented about
a popular restaurant: \No one goes there any more because it's too crowded."
The other possible reason for persistent mispricing is that some relevant pieces of
public information are ignored or misused by everyone. This can occur either because
the signals are obscurely located or because our shared model of the world is just not
sophisticated enough to make their relevance clear. A pricing error of this sort may
disappear once a smart econometrician identies it.
It is impossible to be comprehensive on a topic of this scope. Several important
topics have been discussed in greater depth elsewhere.
9
My focus is on the psychology
of imperfect rationality, not psychological determinants of rational risk aversion or time
preference. My benchmark for comparison throughout is the traditional asset pricing
paradigm; I do not cover market imperfections, nor models of rational bubbles.
I Judgment and Decision Biases
This section describes some psychological eects that are potentially relevant for securi-
ties markets, with hints at possible explanations based upon adaptiveness.
10
Economists
have traditionally been skeptical of the varied array of seemingly arbitrary biases oered
8
The U.S. small rm eect was strongly positive every year during 1974-83, and then was negative for
six out of the next seven years; The two closing years of the millenium, which followed the publication
of an important paper on \...Good News for Value Stocks" (LaPorta et al (1997)) were the worst years
for value stocks since 1928, though 2000 was better.
9
I generally focus on asset market regularities involving a time horizon of at least a month, and do
not consider seasonalities (for recent evidence see Hawawini, Keim, and Ziemba (2000)). Several surveys
examine the equity premium puzzle in greater depth (see, e.g., Campbell (1999, 2000), Kocherlakota
(1996), and Mehra and Prescott (2001)). Experiments in psychology and economics are surveyed in
Bossaerts (2000), Camerer (1995, 1998), and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001).
10
See also the surveys of Camerer (1995), DeBondt and Thaler (1995), Rabin (1998), and Shiller
(1999). There are also important literatures that build `fast and frugal' heuristics based upon ex ante
considerations [Gigerenzer, Todd, and ABC-Group (1999)], and that model the decision consequences
of bounds on rationality [Conlisk (1996)].
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by experimental psychology. The empirical ndings gain credence if we can understand
what causes them. I argue here that these patterns generally derive from common roots.
Since time and cognitive resources are limited, we cannot analyze the data the envi-
ronment provides us with optimally. Instead, natural selection has designed minds that
implement rules of thumb (`algorithms', `heuristics', or `mental modules') selectively to
a subset of cues (see Simon (1956)). Such heuristics are eective when applied to ap-
propriate problems. But their inevitable biases can become agrant when used outside
their ideal domain of applicability.
Economists often argue that errors are independent across individuals, and therefore
cancel out in equilibrium. However, people share similar heuristics, those that worked
well in our evolutionary past. So on the whole we should be subject to similar biases.
Systematic biases (common to most people, and predictable based upon the nature of the
decision problem) have been conrmed in a vast literature in experimental psychology.
There is much debate about exactly how good a job heuristics do. While psychologists
such as Kahneman and Tversky have made clear that heuristics can play a positive role,
in the last decade, evolutionary (Darwinian) psychologists have strongly emphasized the
adaptiveness of cognitive processes. In many cases biases diminish but do not vanish
when probabilities are reexpressed as numerical frequencies,
11
and when problems are
posed in visual formats. However, there is no guarantee that nancial decision problems
will be presented to individuals in a manner that favors the most accurate decisions.
The modern environment diers greatly from the prehistoric environment of evo-
lutionary adaption for which human cognitive mechanisms were designed by natural
selection. Modern humans deal with new abstractions such as securities, money, imper-
sonal markets, probabilities, and government; and with temptations such as easy access
to fats and sugars, gambling casinos, and real-time internet trading.
The general fact that cognitive resource constraints force the use of heuristics to
make decisions I will call heuristic simplication. (For cognitive resource constraints,
read limited attention, processing power and memory.) A second source of bias arises
indirectly from cognitive constraints. This is that natural selection probably did not
design human minds solely to make good decisions. Trivers (1985, 1991) discusses evi-
dence that people cannot perfectly control indicators of their true internal states. This
creates selection for the ability to read subtle cues such as facial expression, eye contact,
posture, tone of voice, and speech tempo to infer the mental states of other individu-
11
See Cosmides and Tooby (1996), Gigerenzer (1991, 1996), Gigerenzer and Horage (1995), Kahne-
man and Tversky (1996) and Tversky and Kahneman (1983)).
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als. In Trivers' self-deception theory, individuals are designed to think they are better
(smarter, stronger, better friends) than they really are. Truly believing this helps the
individual fool others about these qualities.
I argue that heuristic simplication and self-deception together provide a unied
explanation for most of the judgment and decision biases identied in experimental
psychology. This framework can provide guidance as to which biases identied in exper-
iments represent general mechanisms, and which are conditional side-eects.
12
Why don't people simply learn their way out of biased judgments? To some extent
they do. One barrier is that learning is just too hard. The other barrier arises from
self-deception. Individuals who think they are already competent may be slow to adjust
their decision procedures (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth (1978)).
Much of the evidence described here derives from experiments by economists and
psychologists; their methods are somewhat dierent. Financial economists are familiar
with criticisms of psychological experiments: that the stakes are low, that subjects
have little experience with the experimental setting, that there is weak incentive to pay
attention or tell the truth, and that publication depends on nding an eect. What may
not be as familiar is that there is data addressing these issues. On the whole training
and increasing rewards and number of repetitions often reduces, but does not eliminate
biases. Lessons learned through repetition often do not carry over well across seemingly
similar tasks. The well-known biases have been subjected to replication.
13
Many (though
not all) of the cognitive biases are stronger for individuals with low cognitive ability or
skills than for those with high ability or skills, consistent with biases being genuine errors
(see Stanovich and West (2000)).
Subsections I.1 and I.2 consider individual biases organized by proposed causes
(heuristic simplication and self-deception). Subsection I.3 considers emotion and self-
control, Subsection I.4 discusses social interactions, and Subsection I.5 discusses model-
ing alternatives to expected utility theory and to Bayesian updating.
12
Explanations based upon cognitive adaptiveness are subject to the objection that it is too easy to
come up with `just-so' stories that t the data ex post. However, my goal here is not to make the
case that the evidence supports the adaptiveness approach (see Barkow, Cosmides, and Tooby (1992)).
Rather, my point is that it is hard to make sense out of biases without a conceptual framework.
Adaptiveness is about the only one we have.
13
See, e.g., Camerer (1995), Rabin (1998) and Hertwig and Ortmann (2001).
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I.1 Heuristic Simplication
I.1.1 Attention/Memory/Ease-of-Processing Eects
Limited attention, memory, and processing capacities force a focus on subsets of available
information. Unconscious associations also create selective focus. In many studies,
priming subjects with (possibly irrelevant) verbal information triggers associations that
inuence judgments (see, e.g., Gilovich (1981), Higgins (1996)).
Selective triggering of associations causes salience and availability eects (e.g., Kah-
neman and Tversky (1973)). An information signal is salient if it has characteristics
(e.g., diering from the background or from a past state) that are good at hooking our
attention or at creating associations that facilitate recall. In the availability heuristic
(Tversky and Kahneman (1973)), items that are easier to recall are judged to be more
common. This generally makes sense, since things that are more common are noticed or
reported more often, making them easier to remember. Shiller (2000b) suggested that
the ease with which regular Web users can think of examples relating to the internet
revolution encouraged the market boom of the late 1990s.
One reason people are inuenced by the the format of decision problems is that
they cannot perfectly retrieve relevant information from memory (Tversky and Kahne-
man (1973), Pennington and Hastie (1988)). People underweight the probabilities of
contingencies that are not explicitly available for consideration (Fischho, Slovic, and
Lichtenstein (1978)). This suggests a kind of overcondence (see Subsection I.2), and
apparent market overreaction when unforeseen contingencies do occur.
According to self-perception theory (Bem (1972)), \Individuals come to know their
own attitudes, emotions and internal states by inferring them from observations of their
own behavior and circumstances in which they occur." The need to infer can result from
memory loss, or from simple lack of access to unconscious internal states. A tendency
to form habits can be an optimal mechanism to address memory loss, reecting an
implicit self-perception that actions taken before probably had a good reason (Hirshleifer
and Welch (2000)). Habits also economize on thinking. Habits, including the habitual
adherence to self-imposed rules can also play a role in self-regulation strategies (e.g,
consume only out of dividends, not principal; see Shefrin and Statman (1984), Thaler
and Shefrin (1981)).
The halo eect causes someone who likes one outstanding characteristic of an in-
dividual to extend this favorable evaluation to the individual's other characteristics
(Nisbett and Wilson (1977a)). An analogous misattribution bias could potentially cause
9
stock market mispricing. In an eÆcient market, a stock being good in terms of growth
prospects says nothing about its prospects for future risk-adjusted returns (which are on
average zero). If people mistakenly extend their favorable evaluation of a stock's earn-
ings prospects to its return prospects, growth stocks will be overpriced (see Lakonishok,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), Shefrin and Statman (1995)).
Familiar signal combinations (e.g., yellow with banana) are easier to perceive than
unfamiliar ones (Bruner, Postman, and Rodrigues (1951)). There is a strong and robust
mere exposure eect in which exposure to an unreinforced stimulus tends to make people
like it more (see, e.g., Bornstein and D'Agostino (1992), Moreland and Beach (1992)).
The basis for this heuristic may be that what is familiar, being understood better,
is often less risky. However, this can be taken too far, as when people prefer to bet
on a matter about which they know more than another equivalent gamble (Heath and
Tversky (1991)). People also like similarity in choice of friends and mates (Berscheid and
Reis (1998)). According to evolutionary psychology, people prefer familiar and similar
individuals because these were indicators of genetic relatedness (e.g., Trivers (1985)).
These biases suggest a tendency to prefer local investments (see also Huberman (1999)).
A literature in psychology has examined how subjects learn by observation over time
to predict a variable that is stochastically related to multiple cues (see, e.g., Kruschke and
Johansen (1999)). A pervasive nding is that animals and people do not achieve correct
understanding of the correlation structure. Instead, cue competition occurs: salient cues
weaken the eects of less salient ones, and the presence of irrelevant cues causes subjects
to use relevant cues and base rates (unconditional frequencies) less. There is also learned
utilization of irrelevant cues. Cue competition raises interesting questions about how
information ooding through the internet will aect misvaluation.
The learned usage of irrelevant cues comes close to magical thinking, the belief in
relations between causally unrelated actions or events (as with astrology and other su-
perstitions). A type of magical thinking called the illusion of control consists of the
belief that a person can favorably inuence unrelated chance events. A possible exam-
ple example is that people value lottery ticket numbers they select more than randomly
assigned ones (Langer (1975)).
I.1.2 Narrow Framing/Mental Accounting/Reference Eects
Narrow framing (see Kahneman and Lovallo (1993), Read, Loewenstein, and Rabin
(1999)) involves analyzing problems in too isolated a fashion. This makes excellent
sense when time and cognitive resources are limited. Many problems can be compart-
10
mentalized safely. An implication is that the form of presentation of logically identical
decision problems, such as the highlighting of a dierent reference for comparison of out-
comes can have large framing eects on choices (Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986)).
Optimizing with respect to a problem-specic reference point, and having a direct prefer-
ence over deviations (instead of over total consumption) economizes on thinking. Money
illusion is another documented example of sensitivity to irrelevant description features
(Shar, Diamond, and Tversky (1997)).
By using dierent presentation or procedures, experimenters can elicit preference
reversals. Faced with a choice between a binary lottery with a high probability but
relatively low maximum payo, versus another with lower probability and higher maxi-
mum payo, subjects often tend to prefer the high probability lottery, yet place a higher
valuation on the high-maximum-payo lottery!
14
There are also context eects, in which
the presence of a non-selected choice alternative aects which alternative is selected.
Mental accounting (Thaler (1985)) is a kind of narrow framing that involves keeping
track of gains and losses related to decisions in separate mental accounts, and to reex-
amine each account only intermittently when action-relevant. Mental accounting may
explain the disposition eect (Shefrin and Statman (1985)), an excessive propensity to
hold on to securities that have declined in value and to sell winners. Having observa-
tion of gains and losses trigger pleasant or unpleasant feelings seems a sensible mental
design to motivate protable actions. Such a mechanism may, however, be sidetracked
when the individual avoids recognizing losses. Self-deception theory reinforces this argu-
ment, because a loss is an indicator of low decision ability, and a self-deceiver maintains
self-esteem by avoiding recognition of such indicators.
Related arguments can explain the house money eect (Thaler and Johnson (1990))|
a greater willingness to gamble with money that was recently won. The unpleasantness
of a loss of recently-won money may be diluted by aggregating it with the earlier gain.
Anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman (1974)) is the phenomenon that people tend
to be unduly inuenced in their assessment of some quantity by arbitrary quantities
mentioned in the statement of the problem, even when the quantities are clearly unin-
formative. Some recent authors oer and test possible explanations in which the process
of evaluating the anchor makes anchor-consistent arguments more accessible.
15
According to expected utility theory, utility derives solely from the probability dis-
tribution of payos resulting from a choice. However, people seem to be regret averse in
14
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971), Grether and Plott (1979), Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990).
15
Chapman and Johnson (1999), Mussweiler and Strack (1999).
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their choices (e.g., Josephs et al (1996), Ritov (1996)). They seem to be concerned not
just that a choice may lead to low consumption, but that consumption may be lower
than the outcome provided by an alternative choice.
An eÆcient heuristic method of comparing decision alternatives may be to line up and
compare possible outcomes by state of the world (rather than evaluating the expected
utility of each alternative separately and then comparing). Thus, having feelings be
triggered by comparison of outcomes may be an eective mechanism for motivating
good choices. Regret avoidance may also reect a self-deception mechanism designed to
protect self-esteem about decisionmaking ability (Josephs et al (1996)).
Regret is stronger for decisions that involve action rather than passivity (Kahneman
and Tversky (1982)), an eect sometimes called the omission bias (Ritov and Baron
(1990)). Regret aversion can explain the endowment eect, a preference for people to
hold on to what they have rather than exchange for a better alternative, as with the
refusal of individuals to swap a lottery ticket for an equivalent one plus cash.
16
The status
quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988)) involves preferring the choice designated
as the default or status quo among a list of alternatives.
Loss aversion is the phenomenon that people tend to be averse even to very small risks
relative to a reference point, suggesting a kink in the utility function. This may result
from the cognitive eÆciency of mentally discretizing continuous variables, as reected in
the use of terms like `gain,' `break even,' and `loss', which make the distinction between
a gain and loss more salient.
I.1.3 The Representativeness Heuristic
The representativeness heuristic (Grether (1980), Kahneman and Tversky (1973), Tver-
sky and Kahneman (1974)) involves assessing the probability of a state of the world
based on the degree to which the evidence is perceived as similar to or typical of the
state of the world. Similarity can be viewed as an indicator of the conditional probability
of the evidence given the state of the world versus other states. However, a Bayesian also
takes into account heavily the prior probability of the outcomes, whereas people tend to
underweight statements about unconditional population frequencies in performing con-
ditional updating|base-rate underweighting. Furthermore, people's perceptions of how
`representative' a piece of evidence is of a state of the world may match its conditional
probability poorly. For example, people tend to rely too heavily on small samples (the
16
See Bar-Hillel and Neter (1996), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), Knez, Smith, and
Williams (1985).
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`law of small numbers') and rely too little on large samples, inadequately discount for the
regression phenomenon, and discount inadequately for selection bias in the generation or
reporting of evidence.
17
Representativeness eects have been detected in experimental
markets (see Camerer (1995), Section II.C.4).
The idea that a sample should resemble the population is often correct, especially in
a large unbiased independent sample. The preceding errors amount to applying an infer-
ence too weakly within its realm of validity (large sample size) and too strongly beyond
its realm of validity (small sample size). This is a natural consequence of the tradeos
involved with the design of an eÆcent heuristic. The resulting errors are not random:
here, the error is predictable based on the sample size. The law of small numbers suggests
that newly-popular theories about the market drawn from recent investment experience
may cause overreaction.
Misunderstanding of how randomness works can also cause a phenomenon of gam-
bler's fallacy. This is the belief that in an independent sample the recent occurence of
one outcome increases the odds that the next outcome will dier. In fact people avoid
betting on a lottery number that was a winner sometime over the preceding few days
(Clotfelter and Cook (1993)).
On the other hand, use of the representativeness heuristic can cause trend-chasing,
because people are to ready to believe that trends have systematic causes. Statisticians
refer to the clustering illusion, wherein people perceive random clusters as reecting a
causal pattern. People mistakenly believe in `hot hands' among sports players even when
actual performance is very close to serially independent (Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky
(1985)). In an experimental market, consistent with gambler's fallacy, Andreassen and
Kraus (1990) found that when exogenous prices uctuate modestly, subjects buy on dips
and sell on rises. However, when a trend appears subjects do less of this tracking, and
possibly switch to chasing trends. There is further evidence from experiments and from
surveys that real estate and stock market investors extrapolate trends in forecasting
price movements.
18
I.1.4 Belief Updating: Combining Eects
Edwards (1968) identied the phenomenon of conservatism, that under appropriate cir-
cumstances individuals do not change their beliefs as much as would a rational Bayesian
17
See, e.g., Brenner, Koehler, and Tversky (1996), GriÆn and Tversky (1992), Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1973), Nisbett and Ross (1980) ch.4 and references therein, and Tversky and Kahneman (1971).
18
See DeBondt (1993), Case and Shiller (1990), and Shiller (1988).
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in the face of new evidence. The more useful the evidence, the greater the shortfall
between actual updating and rational updating.
Having a framework for assessing biases can help when they seem to conict. For
example, conservatism implies underweighting of new evidence. Yet if we view prior
beliefs as a base-rate, conservatism would seem to contradicts base-rate underweighting.
Perhaps conservatism is a consequence of anchoring upon an initial probability estimate.
Yet the representativeness heuristic predicts that people will extrapolate too strongly
from patterns in small samples, and salience bias also causes people to overreact to
certain kinds of information. Which bias do we believe?
To resolve conicts like this requires a focus on underlying causes, and how they will
operate in a particular setting. For example, self-deception can cause conservatism in
a stable environment, because an individual who has explicitly adopted a belief may
be reluctant to admit to himself that he made a mistake. On the other hand, if the
environment is volatile, there may be no dishonor in recognizing that dierent beliefs
are called for.
One explanation for conservatism is that processing new information and updating
beliefs is costly. There is evidence that information that is presented in a cognitively
costly form is weighed less: information that is abstract and statistical, such as sam-
ple size and probabilistic base-rate information. Furthermore, people may overreact to
information that is easily processed, i.e., scenarios and concrete examples.
The costly-processing argument can be extended to explain base rate underweighting.
If an individual underweights new information received about population frequencies
(base rates), then base rate underweighting is really a form of conservatism. Indeed,
base rates are underweighted less when they are presented in more salient form or in
a fashion which emphasizes their causal relation to the decision problem (see Koehler
(1996)). This costly-processing-of-new-information argument does not suggest that an
individual will underweight his pre-existing internalized prior belief. On the other hand,
if base rate underweighting is a consequence of the use of the representativeness heuristic,
there should be underweighting of priors.
GriÆn and Tversky (1992) suggest that base-rate underweighting and conservatism,
interpreted as under- versus over-reaction to signals, can be understood as results of
excessive reliance on the strength of information signals and underreliance on the weight
of information signals. The strength of an information realization is how `extreme' the
evidence is (in some sense), and the weight of evidence is its reliability or precision.
For example, a large sample of conditionally i.i.d. signals has high weight. But if
14
the preponderance of favorable over unfavorable signals is modest, it has low strength.
Conservatism arises when people rely too little on high weight evidence such as a long
sample, and base rate neglect when people rely too heavily on high-strength evidence
such as a few signals all in one direction.
In summary, dierent experimental settings can lead to under- or over-reliance on new
signals; people seem to make judgments dierently in dierent situations (see Grether
(1992), Payne, Bettman, and Johnson (1992)). Given the dierent possible eects,
invoking the name of a bias does not provide compelling support for assuming under-
or over-reaction in a nancial model. Further support can be provided by comparing
the economic decision environment of the model with the specic experimental decision
setting in which the bias was documented, and especially by running new experiments
that match closely the decision environment in the nancial model.
Most studies of price forecasts nd biased that is predictable using current observ-
ables. For example, forecasts are often found to be adaptive, i.e., they respond partially
to past forecast errors.
19
Such biases are potentially consistent either with Bayesian
learning with an unknown distribution, or with overcondence. Experimental studies
involving a xed distribution generally also yield biases, and forecasts are adaptive in
most forecast experiments involving endogenously determined prices as well (see Camerer
(1995), Section II.E). Consistent with overcondence, forecasters seem to put too little
weight on the known forecasts of other forecasters (Batchelor and Dua (1992)).
Analyst forecasts of earnings are over-optimistic at long time horizons and pessimistic
at short horizons (e.g., Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (1999)). Such biases may come
from misperceptions or from agency incentives. However, we would normally expect
rational agents to provide at least a positive incremental value in their forecasting ac-
tivities. There is conicting evidence as to whether stock market analysts' forecasts
of earnings do better or worse than a time-series forecast (see the review of Kothari
(2000)). A large literature shows that real-world decisionmakers such as PhD admission
committees or doctors do not predict outcomes as well as mechanical decision rules based
on simple linear combinations of objective input measures (see Camerer (1991)). This
suggests that the rise of arbitrage based upon modern statistical analysis in securities
markets will indeed reduce mispricing.
19
See the discussions in Lovell (1986) and Williams (1987), but see also Keane and Runkle (1990).
There is a similar nding for survey forecasts of macroeconomic variables (e.g., Aggarwal, Mohanty,
and Song (1995)).
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I.2 Self-Deception
The self-deception theory implies overcondence, a very well-documented bias (as re-
viewed, e.g., in Odean (1998b)).
20
An extensive literature on calibration shows that
people believe their knowledge is more accurate than it really is.
21
For example, their
predictions of probabilities of events are too extreme (too high relative to the true fre-
quency when they think the event probably will occur, too low when they think it will
not). The condence intervals they provide for quantities are too narrow, e.g., 98% con-
dence intervals contain the true quantity only 60% of the time (Alpert and Raia (1982)).
Experts are well-calibrated in some contexts but not others (see Camerer (1995) p. 592-
3). Experts can be more prone to overcondence than non-experts when predictability is
low and evidence is ambiguous (GriÆn and Tversky (1992)). Overcondence is greater
for challenging judgment tasks, and individuals tend to be more overcondent when
feedback on their information or decisions is deferred or inconclusive.
22
Overcondence is sometimes reversed for very easy items (Lichtenstein and Fischo
(1977)).
23
Overcondence implies overoptimism about the individual's ability to succeed
in his endeavors. Such optimism has been found in a number of dierent settings (Miller
and Ross (1975)). Men tend to be more overcondent than women, though the size of
the dierence depends on whether the task is perceived to be masculine or feminine.
24
Since people fail more often than they expect to, rational learning over time would
tend to eliminate overcondence. So for self-deception to succeed, nature must provide
mechanisms that bias the learning process. This is consistent with self-enhancing biased
self-attribution. People tend to attribute good outcomes to their own abilities, and
bad outcomes to external circumstances.
25
Overcondence and biased self-attribution
are static and dynamic counterparts; self-attribution causes individuals to learn to be
20
Bernardo and Welch (2000) provide an alternative theory of overcondence based on group infor-
mational benets.
21
See, e.g., Keren (1991), Lichtenstein, Fischo, and Phillips (1982), McClelland and Bolger (1994),
and Yates (1990).
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Einhorn (1980), Fischho, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977), GriÆn and Tversky (1992), Lichtenstein,
Fischo, and Phillips (1982), Yates (1990).
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This is not surprising on mechanical grounds; in the extreme case of perfect decision accuracy, it
is possible to be under- but not over- condent about accuracy. It has been suggested that apparent
overcondence could be an artifact of the choice of questions that are not a \representative sample of the
knowledge domain" (e.g., Gigerenzer, Horage, and Kleinbolting (1991)), but overcondence remains
when questions are randomly selected from the knowledge domain, and has been documented in many
practical choice settings (GriÆn and Tversky (1992), Brenner et al (1996), Soll (1996)).
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Deaux and Emswiller (1974), Lenney (1977), Lundeberg, Fox, and Puncochar (1994).
25
Fischo (1982), Langer and Roth (1975), Miller and Ross (1975), and Taylor and Brown (1988).
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overcondent rather than converging to an accurate self-assessment.
Self-deception also explains why there are action-induced attitude changes of the sort
that motivate the theory of cognitive dissonance.
26
In one experiment people who chose
between two products downgraded their assessments of the one they did not pick. In an-
other, women who had to exert greater eort to gain entry to a group subsequently liked
the group more. In other experiments, people who were induced with mild incentives or
by request to express opinions became more sympathetic to those opinions. A tendency
to be excessively attached to activities for which one has expended resources, the sunk
cost eect, has been conrmed in several contexts (Arkes and Blumer (1985)). The self-
deception theory suggests that a tendency to adjust attitudes to match past actions is
a mechanism designed to persuade the individual that he is a skillful decisionmaker (see
also Nel, Helmreich, and Aronson (1969) and Steele and Liu (1983).
Similar reasoning can explain hindsight bias (e.g., Hawkins and Hastie (1990))| it
helps our self-esteem to think we `knew it all along'; and the phenomenon of rationalization|
constructing a plausible ex post rationale for past choices helps an individual feel better
about his decision competence. People are very ready to devise and apparently believe
their explanations for alleged facts about the world as well as themselves.
27
People tend to interpret ambiguous evidence in a fashion consistent with their own
prior beliefs. They give careful scrutiny to inconsistent facts and explain them as due
to luck or faulty data-gathering (see Gilovich (1991) ch.4). This conrmatory bias can
help maintain self-esteem, consistent with self-deception. Exposure to evidence should
tend to cause rational Bayesians with diering beliefs to converge, whereas the attitudes
of experimental subjects exposed to mixed evidence tend to become more polarized
(e.g., Isenberg (1986), Lord, Ross, and Lepper (1979)). Forsythe et al (1992) nd that
individuals more subject to this conrmation bias lose money in an experimental market
to those who are less subject to it. Conrmatory bias may cause some investors to stick
to unsuccessful trading strategies, causing mispricing to persist.
Some general biases toward conrmation of hypotheses do not rely on self-deception.
In evaluating hypotheses assigned by the experimenter about the relation of two kinds
of variables (e.g., studying the night before an exam, and getting a good grade), a large
literature nds that people put too much weight on conrming evidence. This involves
focusing on cases in which both study and a good grade occurred, and neglecting other
26
Festinger and Carlsmith (1959), Cooper and Fazio (1984) and Harmon-Jones and Mills (1999) ch.1).
27
See, e.g., Gazzaniga (1988) pp.12-14, Nisbett and Wilson (1977b), Ross et al (1977).
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information (cases in which one but not the other occurred).
28
It has been argued that
such a bias is an eÆcient shortcut in many contexts (Klayman and Ha (1987)).
People are also biased toward seeking conrmatory information. In the famous Wa-
son task experiments (Wason (1966)), subjects were asked to turn over cards to evaluate
a hypothesis. They often turned over cards which potentially could provide instances
consistent with the hypothesis, and often left unturned cards that could conclusively
reject the hypothesis. A possible explanation is that positive cases are easier to pro-
cess cognitively. There is evidence that people are more inuenced by the information
reected in the occurrence of an event than the non-occurrence.
29
I.3 Emotions and Self-Control
Emotions probably play a role in such traditionally rational considerations as time and
risk preference, and in most or all of the eects described earlier. I discuss some further
aspects of emotion here.
I.3.1 Distaste for Ambiguity
Choices are inuenced by the structure of gambles above and beyond the overall prob-
ability distribution of consumption outcomes that the gambles provide. The Ellsberg
paradoxes (Ellsberg (1961)) suggested that people are averse to ambiguity, causing irra-
tional choices. Ambiguity aversion has been conrmed in market experimental settings.
It seems to reect a more general tendency for emotions such as fear to aect risky
choices (see Peters and Slovic (1996)). As suggested by Camerer (1995), ambiguity
aversion may increase risk premia unduly when new nancial markets are introduced,
because of the layering of uncertainty about both the structure of the economic envi-
ronment and about resulting outcomes. A possible explanation for ambiguity aversion
is that the obvious absence of an identiable parameter of the decision problem may
often be associated with higher risk and the possibility of hostile manipulation. This
justies a focus on missing information, but such an heuristic can go astray when there
is no hostile manipulation. In a related vein, the evidence of Heath and Tversky (1991)
indicates that, holding probabilities constant, people prefer gambles that give them a
sense of understanding or competence.
28
See e.g., Crocker (1982), Fischho and Beyth-Marom (1983), and Jenkins and Ward (1965).
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E.g., Newman, Wol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I.3.2 Mood and Decisions
Risk aversion, regret aversion, and loss aversion may reect a calculated avoidance of
unpleasant future feelings. However, mood and emotions felt today also aect risk tak-
ing. For example, sales of State of Ohio lottery tickets were found to increase in the days
following a football victory by Ohio State University (Arkes, Herren, and Isen (1988)).
More generally, people who are in good moods are more optimistic in their choices and
judgments than those in bad moods (see, e.g., Wright and Bower (1992)). Feelings aect
people's perceptions of and choices with respect to risk (see, e.g., Mann (1992)). Bad
moods are associated with more detailed and critical strategies of evaluating information
(Petty, Gleicher, and Baker (1991)). The inuence of mood and emotion on purchase
plans and the eects of advertising have been studied by marketing researchers as well.
30
Aective states (feelings or moods) contain information that individuals can use
to draw inferences about the environment.
31
However, people often attribute arousal or
feelings to the wrong source, leading to incorrect judgments or misattribution biases (see,
e.g., Ross (1977)). For example, people feel happier on sunny days than on rainy days,
but priming them by asking them about the weather aects their judgment of how happy
they are (Schwarz and Clore (1983)). Moods states tend to aect relatively abstract
judgments more than specic ones about which people have concrete information.
32
This suggests, for example, that if the weather in New York puts stock market traders
in a bad mood, their pessimism may concern long-term market growth prospects rather
than whether the Fed is going to lower interest rates next week.
I.3.3 Time Preference and Self-Control
The conventional representation of decisions over time has an additively separable utility
function with exogenous, declining exponential weights. However, evidence from psy-
chology suggests that discount rates change with circumstances. Deferring consumption
involves self-control, and is therefore related to mood and feelings. There is evidence
that discount rates are sometimes remarkably high, that gains are discounted more heav-
ily than losses, that small magnitudes are discounted more heavily than large, that the
framing of a choice as a delay versus an advance has a large eect on decisions, that
time preference diers greatly in dierent decision domains (e.g., money versus health),
30
Barone, Miniard, and Romeo (2000), Cohen and Areni (1991), Erevelles (1998), Mano (1999).
31
See e.g., Clore, Schwarz, and Conway (1994), Wilson and Schooler (1991).
32
Clore, Schwarz, and Conway (1994), Forgas (1995).
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and that visceral inuences such as pain or hunger aect intertemporal choices.
33
The exponential specication is time consistent. However, experimental studies sug-
gest that people and non-human animals are time-inconsistent. Specically, they tend
to discount a deferral of consumption from date t to t + 1 more heavily as date t ap-
proaches, consistent for example with a hyperbolic form for discount rates.
34
This causes
choice reversals even when no new information arrives. Hyperbolic discounting has been
disputed.
35
Nevertheless, recent economic studies have applied time-inconsistent dis-
counting to a wide range of issues including savings, liquidity premia and the equity
premium puzzle.
36
I.4 Social Interactions
Financial economists have borrowed more from the psychology of the individual than
from social psychology. Financial theorists have examined how information is trans-
mitted by prices, volume or corporate actions. However, person-to-person and media
contagion of ideas and behavior also seems important. People tend to conform with
the judgments and behaviors of others, as documented in the famous length estima-
tion experiments of Asch (1956). A meta-analysis of 133 related studies (Bond and
Smith (1996)) conrmed the conformity eect, which is, however, history- and culture-
dependent. There are rational informational reasons to learn by observing the actions
of others.
37
However, a fully descriptive analysis will have to encompass imperfect ra-
tionality (see e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995)).
Conversation is critical in the contagion of popular ideas about nancial markets, as
emphasized by Shiller (2000a).
38
In a survey of individual investors, Shiller and Pound
(1989) found that almost all of the investors who recently purchased a stock had their
attention drawn to it through direct interpersonal communication. The inuence of
conversation on trading may arise from individuals' overcondence about their ability
to distinguish pertinent information from noise or propaganda; examples of large price
33
See e.g., the discussions of Chapman (1998), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), and Loewenstein
(1996, 2000).
34
See Ainslie (1975), Kirby and Herrnstein (1995), Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), Thaler (1981).
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See Fernandez-Villaverde and Mukherji (2000), Mulligan (1996) Rubinstein (2000).
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See Harris and Laibson (2001), Laibson (1997), Luttmer and Mariotti (2000), O'Donoghue and
Rabin (1999).
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See, e.g., Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992); on the possibility of infor-
mational cascades in securities markets, see Avery and Zemsky (1998), Lee (1998).
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(2000).
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movements triggered by internet chat comes to mind.
As discussed by Shiller (1999), because of limited attention people tend to pay much
more attention to ideas or facts that are reinforced by conversation, ritual and symbols.
In consequence culture becomes an important determinant of behavior, and expression
of ideas can be self-reinforcing. Kuran and Sunstein (1999) describe the process of
belief formation as leading to `availability cascades', wherein an expressed perception is
perceived to be more plausible as a consequence of its increased availability in public
discourse.
Conversation pools information surprisingly poorly. Groups of people tend to talk
much more about information signals that they already share than individuals-specic
signals (Stasser, Taylor, and Hanna (1989)). As a result groups sometimes fail to de-
tect patterns that are discernable by combining individual-specic signals (Stasser and
Titus (1985)). Environmental pressures such as crowding and unusual circumstances
cause group members to experience `cognitive overload,' and rigid thinking (adherence
to habitual behaviors; see Argote, Turner, and Fichman (1988)).
When communicating information, people tend to sharpen and level, i.e., emphasize
what they construe to be the main point, and deemphasize qualifying details that might
confuse this point. This is necessary for clarity given cognitive constraints (Allport
and Postman (1947), Anderson (1932)), but tends to cause listener beliefs to move to
extremes. A closely related point is that causes tend to be oversimplied, distorting
listener beliefs. There are also systematic message distortions related to a desire to be
entertaining or to manipulate the listener (see Gilovich (1991), ch. 6). These facts point
to the need for analysis of conversation and rumors in securities markets.
The fundamental attribution error (Ross (1977)) is the tendency for individuals to
underestimate the importance of external circumstances and overestimate the impor-
tance of disposition in determining the behavior of others. In a nancial context, such
a bias might cause observers of a repurchase to conclude that the CEO dislikes holding
excess cash rather than that the CEO is responding to market undervaluation of the
stock. This would suggest market underreaction to corporate events.
People mistakenly believe that others share their beliefs more than they really do, the
false consensus eect (e.g., Ross, Green, and House (1977)). Self-deception may encour-
age this by making the individual reluctant to consider the possibility that he is making
a deviant error. False consensus may also result from availability (since like-minded
people tend to associate together). The curse of knowledge (Camerer, Loewenstein, and
Weber (1989)) is a tendency to think that others who are less informed are more similar
21
in their beliefs to the observer than they really are.
I.5 Modelling Alternatives to Expected Utility and to Bayesian
Updating
Expected utility theory has dominated nancial modelling because it captures rational
decisionmaking elegantly. However, the paradoxes of Allais (1953) and subsequent con-
rmations showed systematic violations of expected utility; people seem to be inuenced
by `irrelevant alternatives'. Further violations have multiplied. Evidence of systematic
preference reversals suggests that choice may not be well described by maximization
of a utility function at all. A less radical departure from the traditional approaches
is to consider alternative objectives (Camerer (1995, 1998) provides an in-depth treat-
ment). Camerer discusses generalizations that involve functional forms on probability
weightings and utility functions, in some cases explicitly derived from modied axioms
of choice.
In prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Tversky and Kahneman (1992)),
individuals maximize a weighted sum of `values' (analogous to utilities), where the
weights are functions of probabilities (instead of true probabilities). Extremely low
probabilities are treated as impossibilities, and extremely high probabilities as certain-
ties. In contrast, very (but not extremely) low probabilities are overestimated, and very
(but not extremely) high probabilities are overestimated. For intermediate probabilities,
the weighting function increases with a slope less than one. The value function is kinked
at the `reference point' (loss aversion).
39
The value function is concave to the right of
the reference point and convex to the left, reecting risk aversion among gambles that
involve only gains and risk seeking among gambles involving only losses.
The advantage of this approach is that it can capture many of the known patterns of
individual choice under risk, as well as nancial regularities (see, e.g., Camerer (1998),
Shiller (1999)). Indeed, Camerer (1998) argues that a form of prospect theory ts the
data better than either expected utility theory or the other generalizations that have
been proposed.
Several other generalizations of time-additively separable expected utility have been
applied to asset pricing issues, especially the equity premium puzzle. Epstein and Zin
39
First-order risk averse preferences (Epstein and Zin (1990)), like loss aversion, involve a utility
function that depends on a reference point, and in which there is nontrivial aversion even to small risks.
In the case of disappointment aversion (Gul (1991)), investors weigh outcomes that are worse than the
certainty-equivalent outcome more heavily than favorable outcomes.
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(1989) developed a class of intertemporal utility functions that allow for non-additivity
and non-expected utility behavior. Priming is a phenomenon in which exposure to a
stimulus aects a subject's later response to further presentation of the same or a re-
lated stimulus. Evidence of priming eects does not tell us how people react to repeated
consumption choices (self-administered stimuli of a sort), but is broadly suggestive that
past consumption levels may inuence how people respond to future consumption lev-
els. Such dependence is reected in habit formation preferences (Constantinides (1990),
Sundaresan (1989)), in which the utility derived from current consumption also depends
on a habitual level of consumption.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995) oer a case based decision theory which, unlike ex-
pected utility theory, is not based on evaluating outcomes and their probabilities. A
case is a menu of decision options. Choices are evaluated based on outcomes of past
choices and how similar those choices are to those in the current menu.
The evidence on heuristics and biases also suggests that Bayesian updating is not
fully descriptive of human behavior. However, Bayes theorem is non-arbitrary, which
is a useful discipline for modelling. Some recent models describe updating based on
self-attribution bias and conrmatory bias.
40
II Evidence of Risk and Mispricing Eects
I classify the evidence bearing on asset mispricing into ve categories: (1) return pre-
dictability; (2) the equity premium puzzle; (3) evidence as to whether rms take actions
in response to mispricing; (4) whether rms take actions in order to create mispricing;
and (5) evidence of investment errors.
41
My emphasis here is on ndings that have
received conrmation over time and location. However, such consistency is not a pre-
requisite for a pattern to be interesting. If widespread and fairly stable patterns of
mispricing exist, then almost surely transient and situation-specic ones do too.
II.1 Predictability of Security Returns
Return predictability research is haunted by the specter of datamining. Some of the
patterns described here are probably just vagaries of chance. However, predictability
40
See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Gervais and Odean (2001), Rabin (2000), Rabin
and Schrag (1999), and Yariv (2001).
41
This topic is vast; for recent reviews of dierent aspects of the evidence pertaining to mispricing,
see Fama (1991, 1998), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2001), Kothari (2000), and Lee (2001). I do not discuss
actions by outsiders such as mutual funds to exploit predictability.
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is a generic prediction of modern asset pricing theories. So cautious skepticism rather
than profound suspicion is called for.
Most of the patterns of return predictability summarized here have dual (and du-
elling) explanations based on either risk premia or mispricing. Empirical papers on
predictability often interpret psychological explanations naively. Several authors in-
terpret evidence that factor loadings or aggregate conditioning variables can capture
predictability as counter to the psychological approach. But the psychological approach
recognizes that investors should care about factor risk. To attribute a return pattern to
rational factor pricing requires not just a nding that factors matter, but measurement
of whether expected returns are commensurate with the relevant risks. Furthermore,
the psychological approach predicts that factors, not just residuals, will be mispriced.
The conditioning variables and the variables used to identify factors, such as aggregate
dividend yield, the term premium, the default premium, book/market, and size, are very
natural proxies for factor misvaluation, as will be discussed.
II.1.1 Predictability Based upon Factor Risk Measures
I focus here on CAPM beta and the factor loadings of Fama and French (1993). A
positive univariate relation of beta with expected returns is found in most studies, but
depends on the country, time period, empirical implementation, and form of the CAPM
being tested.
42
Beta has incremental power to predict future returns after controlling
for market value and/or fundamental/price ratios in some studies but not others.
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II.1.2 Predictability Based upon Price and Benchmark Value Measures
A natural way to identify mispricing is to compare an asset's price to a related value
measure. A remarkably consistent empirical pattern is that almost any such pairing
that researchers try predicts future returns in the right direction{ the `cheap' security
on average appreciates relative to a risk-adjusted benchmark, or relative to an `expensive'
security. EÆcient markets fans will conclude, however, that the security is cheap because
it is riskier, and that the risk adjustment is misspecied.
44
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See, e.g., Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972), Bossaerts (2000), Fama and French (1992), Fama and
MacBeth (1973), Handa, Kothari, andWasley (1993), Harvey (1989), Heston, Rouwenhorst, andWessels
(1999), Kim (1997), Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995), Kothari and Shanken (2000), Rouwenhorst
(1999), Solnik (1974).
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See, e.g., Fama and French (1992, 1996a), Handa, Kothari, and Wasley (1993), Heston, Rouwen-
horst, and Wessels (1999), Jagannathan and Wang (1996), Kim (1997), Knez and Ready (1997), Kothari
and Shanken (2000), and Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995).
44
This insight has been applied to stocks by Ball (1978), Berk (1995), and Keim (1988).
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In several cases the market value of a parent rm has been substantially less than one
of its parts, and managers undertook transactions apparently suitable for exploiting the
overpricing of a division.
45
Closed end funds often trade at discounts and premia relative
to net asset value; these discounts predict future small stock returns.
46
Securities that
are virtually perfect substitutes are sometimes traded at dierent prices by dierent
clienteles (Froot and Dabora (1999), Rosenthal and Young (1990)).
A short-term yield provides a value benchmark for a long term bond. Discrepan-
cies between long- and short-term yields positively predict the holding period returns
on long-term bonds.
47
Bonds denominated in dierent currencies provide mutal bench-
marks. Investing in a country's bonds that have recently become cheaper (higher nominal
yield) relative to another country's bonds on average earns higher returns|the forward
premium puzzle (see, e.g., Engel (1996)).
Stock benchmarks include fundamental measures such as book value, earnings, or
even a constant (for the size eect). Cross-sectionally, equity-price-related variables
(e.g., 1/price, book/market, earnings/price, debt/equity) predict high stock returns in
U.S. and many other countries, even after controlling for beta.
48
For the stock market
as a whole, high fundamental/price ratios (dividend yield or book/market) predict future
index returns in the U.S. and internationally in several, though not all studies.
49
A better
predictor of cross-sectional and aggregate returns can be formed by normalizing price
with earnings-based indices of fundamental value.
50
Market returns are also predictable
based on term and default spreads.
51
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Cornell and Liu (2000), Lamont and Thaler (2000), Schill and Zhou (1999).
46
See Swaminathan (1996), Neal andWheatley (1998). Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995) nd that U.S.-
traded closed-end country fund premia and discounts are often large, and comove primarily because of
their common sensitivity to the U.S. market. Country fund premia predict returns on U.S. size-ranked
portfolios and fund stock returns.
47
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997b), Campbell and Shiller (1991), Cochrane (2000) Sec. 20.1,
Fama and Bliss (1987), Mankiw and Summers (1984), Mankiw (1986), and Shiller, Campbell, and
Schoenholtz (1983).
48
See e.g., Banz (1981), Basu (1983), Bhandari (1988), Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991), Daniel,
Titman, and Wei (2001), Davis (1994), Davis, Fama, and French (2000), DeBondt and Thaler (1987),
Fama and French (1992, 1998), Haugen and Baker (1996), Hawawini and Keim (2000), Heston, Rouwen-
horst, and Wessels (1995), Jagannathan, Kubota, and Takehara (1998), Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein
(1985), Rouwenhorst (1999), and Stattman (1980).
49
See Bossaerts and Hillion (1999), Campbell and Shiller (1988a), Fama and French (1988a), Goet-
zmann, Ibbotson, and Peng (2001), Goyal and Welch (1999), Hodrick (1992), Kothari and Shanken
(1997), Lewellen and Shanken (2000), Pesaran and Timmermann (1995), and Ponti and Schall (1998).
50
See Abarbanell and Bushee (1998), Chang, Chen, and Dong (1999), Frankel and Lee (1998, 1999),
Lee, Myers, and Swaminathan (1999).
51
See Campbell (1987), Fama and French (1989), Keim and Stambaugh (1986).
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Size and value portfolios are associated with a factor or factors distinct from the
stock market portfolio.
52
The loadings on three factors based on size, value and the
market predict the returns on portfolios sorted on various characteristics, but do not
explain short-term momentum; a global two-factor model predicts international returns
(Fama and French (1996b, 1998)).
Several studies report very high Sharpe ratios achievable based on cross-sectional
value eects,
53
a point reinforced by low international correlations of some size and value
strategies (Hawawini and Keim (1995)). This raises the question of whether the implied
variability of marginal utility across states under rational asset pricing is implausibly
high (see Hansen and Jagannathan (1991)). Chen (2000) nds that book/market and
momentum-based portfolios do not contain enough information about future returns on
aggregate wealth to be strongly priced as state variables in a Merton ICAPM.
Fama and French suggest that size and book/market factors may be correlated with
harms suered by individuals when rms are distressed. Diering conclusions have been
drawn about the association of size and book/market with distress.
54
The book/market
eect remains strong after controlling for distress (GriÆn and Lemon (2001)). The
voluntary allocation by employees of personal retirement funds into shares of their own
rms (Benartzi (1997)) opposes the distress-risk hypothesis.
Conclusions dier as to whether `characteristics' (size, book/market) or factor load-
ings do a better job predicting returns.
55
Perhaps the most compelling evidence for
expectational errors is that, after portfolios are formed, growth stocks on average re-
spond very negatively to subsequent earnings announcements for several years, and
value stocks do not (La Porta et al (1997), Skinner and Sloan (2000)).
II.1.3 Predictability Based upon Past Returns: Momentum and Reversal
In many asset and security classes internationally there is positive short-lag autocorre-
lation and negative long-lag autocorrelation.
56
Cross-sectionally, U.S., European, and
52
See Fama and French (1993, 1995), Liew and Vassalou (2000). This of course does not guarantee
that the loadings on these factors are priced separately from market beta; for example, under the CAPM
they would not be.
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Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), MacKinlay
(1995).
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Chan and Chen (1991), Chen and Zhang (1998), Dichev (1998), Shumway (1996).
55
See Daniel and Titman (1997), Daniel, Titman, and Wei (2001), Davis, Fama, and French (2000),
Jagannathan, Kubota, and Takehara (1998), and Lewellen (1999).
56
See Balvers, Wu, and Gilliland (2000), Barkham and Geltner (1995), Case and Shiller (1990),
Chan, Hameed, and Tong (2000), Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1991), Fama and French (1988b),
Gyourko and Keim (1992), Ng and Fu (2000), Poterba and Summers (1988) and Richards (1997). On
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emerging market stocks that have done very well in the recent past (about 3-12 months)
tend to do well over the next month.
57
Long term reversals in the cross-section were
documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985).
58
Momentum is stronger in small rms,
growth rms, rms with low analyst following, and in the security-specic (non-market)
component of stock returns.
59
Volume interacts with momentum in predicting future re-
turns, suggesting a possible cycle of overreaction and correction (Lee and Swaminathan
(2000b)). Chordia and Shivakumar (2000) report that momentum prots can be cap-
tured based on security sensitivities to a few aggregate variables (see also Ahn, Conrad,
and Dittmar (2000)). Lewellen (2000) provides evidence of negative autocorrelation and
cross-serial correlation in industry and size portfolios, consistent with negative market
autocorrelation during the study's time period.
60
Past winners earn substantially higher returns than do past losers at the dates of
quarterly earnings announcements occuring in the 7 months following portfolio forma-
tion.
61
This is suprising from a rational risk perspective because high momentum rms
should become less leveraged and less risky. Also, rms with extremely low returns over
the several months are having trouble, so the distress factor view of value eects suggests
that negative momentum rms should earn high future returns.
II.1.4 Predictability Based upon Public Versus Private News Events
Several event studies have documented abnormal returns subsequent to the event date.
One explanation, event selection, is that a rm's decision whether and when to engage
in the event depends on whether there is market misvaluation. A second possibility, ma-
nipulation, is that around the time of the action the rm recongures other information
methodological and robustness issues for stocks, see Carmel and Young (1997), Jegadeesh (1991), Kim,
Nelson, and Startz (1988), Richardson and Stock (1989), and Richardson and Smith (1994). There
is also a literature on whether stock returns are excessively volatile relative to dividend variability
(Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), Kleidon (1986), LeRoy and Porter (1981), Marsh and Merton
(1986), Shiller (1979, 1981), and West (1988). This is equivalent to the issue of whether there is excessive
long-run reversal in stock prices (see Cochrane (1991)), since any overreaction must increase volatility.
57
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998), Rouwenhorst (1999).
58
On methodological issues and the robustness of this nding, see Ball and Kothari (1989), Ball,
Kothari, and Shanken (1995), Chan (1988), and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (1992).
59
See Daniel and Titman (1999), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (1999), Grundy and Martin (2001), Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2000), and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). Both industry and non-industry components
of momentum help predict future returns (Grundy and Martin (2001), Moskowitz and Grinblatt (1999)).
60
A given serial covariance structure is potentially subject to very dierent causal interpretations.
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) provide a decomposition that distinguishes factors from residuals, and
therefore lends itself to a distinction between factor versus residual autocorrelation.
61
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993); see also Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
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reported to investors in order to induce misvaluation.
There is evidence suggesting that both selection and manipulation occur. Regarding
selection, a remarkable pattern emerges from studies of discretionary corporate events
(actions chosen by management or other potentially informed parties). The average
abnormal stock return in the 3-5 years subsequent to the event has the same sign as the
event-date stock price reaction. I call this regularity post-event return continuation.
62
The evidence that has appeared since this post-event return continuation hypothe-
sis was proposed by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) has generally been
supportive over new time periods and events. There has been little study of post-event
performance for events that are not taken at the discretion of management or analysts
with incentives to react to mispricing. However, Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998)
nd that there is post-event continuation when bank stocks issue equity, except when
equity issuance is forced by reserve requirements.
Fama (1998) argues that these return patterns are sensitive to empirical methodol-
ogy. Several recent studies have concluded that there is limited or no underperformance
of new issue rms.
63
However, some recent methods minimize the power to detect mis-
valuation eects (Loughran and Ritter (2000)). Jegadeesh (1999) reports large post-SEO
underperformance even relative to several (excessively) stringent return benchmarks.
The argument that post-IPO underperformance is eliminated by an appropriate
benchmark is counterintuitive, because it amounts to saying that IPO rms have un-
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Events for which this has been found include stock splits (Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984),
Desai and Jain (1997b), Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996), Ikenberry and Ramnath (2000)); tender
oer and open market repurchases (Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Ver-
maelen (1995, 2000)); equity carveouts (Vijh (1999)); spinos (Cusatis, Miles, and Woolridge (1993),
Desai and Jain (1997a)); accounting writeos (Bartov, Lindahl, and Ricks (1998)); analyst earnings
forecast revisions (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), Lin (2000a, 2000b)); analyst stock rec-
ommendations (Barber et al (2001), Bjerring, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1983), Elton, Gruber, and
Gultekin (1984), Groth et al (1979), Krische and Lee (2000), Michaely and Womack (1999), Wom-
ack (1996)); dividend initiations (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995), Boehme and Sorescu (2000));
dividend omissions (Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995)); seasoned issues of debt (Spiess and Aeck-
Graves (1999)); seasoned issues of common stock (Cornett, Mehran, and Tehranian (1998), Foerster and
Karolyi (2000), Jegadeesh (1999), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995), Teoh,
Welch, and Wong (1998b), but see Kang, Kim, and Stulz (1999)); public announcement of previous
insider trades (Seyhun (1988) and Roze and Zaman (1988)); and venture capital share distributions
(Gompers and Lerner (1998)). The hypothesis has not been tested for IPOs since we do not observe
the price reaction to the announcement that an IPO will occur. The pattern does not hold for exchange
listing (Dharan and Ikenberry (1995), Foerster and Karolyi (1999), and McConnell and Sanger (1987));
and private placements (Hertzel et al (1999)), which may involve informed discretion on the part of the
buying as well as the selling party.
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See Brav, Geczy, and Gompers (2000), Eckbo and Norli (2000), Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000),
Gompers and Lerner (2000), and Mitchell and Staord (2000).
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usually low risk. Risk reduction may justify a low return benchmark for SEO rms,
but risk increases would seem to imply a higher benchmark after debt issues or bond
rating downgrades, making the underperformance after these events
64
even stronger.
Poor post-downgrade performance also opposes the distress-risk-factor theory of return
predictability. New issue rms perform especially badly at subsequent earnings an-
nouncement dates, which is hard to interpret as a negative risk premium.
65
Irrelevant, redundant or old news aects security prices when presented saliently.
66
These demonstrable examples of mispricing suggest that less blatant mispricing may
occur routinely. Little of stock price or orange juice futures price variability has been ex-
plained empirically by relevant public news.
67
Historical crashes and speculative episodes
are often hard to explain in terms of fundamental news.
68
Allen (2001) provides exam-
ples suggesting that bubbles have major economic consequences, and argues that agency
problems among nancial institutions may cause bubbles.
Several studies explore fundamental trends and subsequent returns. Cash or earnings
surprises are followed by positive abnormal returns in the short run, and perhaps negative
abnormal returns in the long run.
69
Investors also seem to extrapolate fundamentals in
options and in football betting markets (Avery and Chevalier (1999), Poteshman (2000)).
II.1.5 Predictability Based upon Mood Proxies
Environmental factors that inuence mood are correlated with stock price movements.
Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000a) nd that a deterministic variable, changes to and
from daylight savings time, disrupts sleep patterns, and is related to stock returns.
70
A stochastic variable, cloud cover in the city of a country's major stock exchange, is
associated with low daily stock index returns in a joint test of 26 national exchanges as
well as in the U.S. (Hirshleifer and Shumway (2000), Saunders (1993)).
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Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1999), Dichev and Piotroski (2001).
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Jegadeesh (1999), Denis and Sarin (2000); see also Ikenberry and Ramnath (2000).
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Andrade (1999), Ashton (1976), Avery and Chevalier (1999), Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2000),
Hand (1990, 1991), Ho and Michaely (1988), Huberman and Regev (2001), Klibano, Lamont, and
Wizman (1999), Rashes (2001), Rau and Vermaelen (1998).
67
Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), Fair (2000), Roll (1984, 1988).
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See, e.g., Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1989), Seyhun (1990), Shiller (2000b) ch.4; for a mainly
rational perspective on the Dutch tulip bulb boom, see Garber (1989).
69
On short run post-earnings announcement drift, see, e.g., Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990). For
poor long lag performance, see DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994),
Lee and Swaminathan (2000a), but see also DeChow and Sloan (1997) and Daniel and Titman (2000).
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Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000b) examine the relation of another deterministic variable, seasonal
shifts in length of day, to returns in several countries.
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II.2 Equity Premium and Riskfree Rate Puzzles
The equity premium puzzle
71
is that U.S. equity market returns are high relative to risk,
implying high levels of risk aversion and so a low elasticity of intertemporal substitution
in consumption. This in turn implies very high real interest rates to induce individuals
to accept lower consumption now than in the future (consistent with historical growth
in consumption; see Weil (1989)).
II.3 Actions Possibly Taken in Response to Mispricing
Corporations buy and sell shares in a way that is correlated with possible measures of
market mispricing.
72
The amount of nancing and repurchase varies widely over time
in an industry-specic way. Mergers bids, which often rely on equity nancing, are also
prone to booms and quiet periods by industry. New closed-end funds are started in
those years when seasoned funds trade at small discounts or at premia relative to net
asset value (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)), and tend to be issued at a premium (plus
commission) before reverting to a discount in the aftermarket (Peavy (1990)).
II.4 Actions Possibly Taken to Create Misvaluation
Firms sometimes make accounting adjustments (accruals) to boost their earnings rel-
ative to actual cash ow. These adjustments are publicly disclosed in rms' nancial
statements. When accruals are abnormally high, stocks on average subsequently ex-
perience poor return performance.
73
Managers boost accruals at the time of new IPO
and seasoned equity issues (Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b)). Greater earnings
management in IPOs and in SEOs is associated with more optimistic errors in analyst
earnings forecasts, and with more adverse subsequent long-run abnormal stock returns.
74
Managers adjust earnings to meet threshold levels such as zero, past levels, and
levels forecast by analysts (DeGeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999)). Possibly under
71
See Hansen and Singleton (1983), Mehra and Prescott (1985), Hansen and Jagannathan (1991),
and Shiller (1982). Purely rational explanations have been oered based upon learning (Brennan and
Xia (2001)), luck (Fama and French (2000)), selection bias in the focus of academic attention (Brown,
Goetzmann, and Ross (1995)), borrowing constraints (e.g., Constantinides, Donaldson, and Mehra
(2000)), and non-stock-market income shocks (e.g., Constantinides and DuÆe (1996) and Heaton and
Lucas (1996)).
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See, e.g., Jindra (2000), D'Mello and Shrof (2000), Dittmar (2000); Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDon-
ald (1991) provide a possible rational explanation for this phenomenon.
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See Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2000), Sloan (1997), Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b).
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See Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 1998b), Teoh and Wong (2000).
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the inuence of management, stock analysts on average `walk down' their forecasts from
overly optimistic levels at long horizons to pessimistic forecasts that rms are likely to
beat by year-end (Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki (1999)).
II.5 Quality of Information Aggregation
In contrast with early classic work on experimental markets, the thrust of much ex-
perimental market research in the late 1980's and 1990's is that in only slightly more
complicated environments, information is not aggregated eÆciently (see, e.g., the surveys
of Libby, Bloomeld, and Nelson (2001), Sunder (1995)). Presumably this is because
confounding eects make it harder for investors to disentangle the reasons behind the
trades of others (see, e.g., Bloomeld (1996)).
II.6 Investor Behavior
Portfolio theory suggests that (apart from transaction costs) everyone should participate
in all security markets. But even now, many investors neglect major asset classes. Non-
participation may derive from salience bias, or from mere exposure (familiarity) eects.
Investors are subject to a strong bias toward investing in stocks based in their home
country and in their local region.
75
Employees invest heavily in their own rm's stock and
perceive it to have low risk (Huberman (1999)). The degree to which they invest in their
employer's stock does not predict the stock's future returns (Benartzi (1997)). There is
also experimental evidence that investors sometimes fail to form eÆcient portfolios and
violate two-fund separation.
76
Several though not all studies of investor behavior in natural and experimental mar-
kets report evidence consistent with a disposition eect|a greater readiness to realize
gains than losses.
77
Certain groups of investors change their behaviors in parallel (`herd-
ing'), in some cases engaging in momentum (or positive feedback) trading and in other
cases in contrarian trading.
78
Similar behavior is not irrational per se, but some groups
of investors do poorly.
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See, e.g., Cooper and Kaplanis (1994), Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2001a), Huberman (1999), Kang and Stulz (1997), Lewis (1999), and Tesar and Werner (1995).
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Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame (2000), Kroll, Levy and Rapoport (1988b, 1988a), and Kroll and Levy
(1992).
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See, e.g., Ferris, Haugen, and Makhija (1988), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001b), Odean (1998a),
Shefrin and Statman (1985), Weber and Camerer (2000); but see also Ranguelova (2000).
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See Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999), Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995), Grinblatt and Keloharju
(2000), Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992), Nofsinger and Sias (1999), and Wermers (1999).
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People (especially males) seem to trade too aggressively, incurring higher transac-
tions costs without higher returns.
79
Furthermore, traders in experimental markets do
not place enough weight on the information and actions of others (Bloomeld, Libby,
and Nelson (1999)). Both ndings are consistent with overcondence. In experimen-
tal markets, as in psychological experiments, investors and prices are more prone to
overreacting to unreliable than to reliable information.
80
Investors not infrequently make agrant errors, such as failing to exercise in-the-
money options at expiration, and apparently failing to exploit arbitrage opportunities
(Longsta, Santa-Clara, and Schwartz (1999), Rietz (1998)). In retirement fund con-
tribution decisions, there is evidence that people are strongly subject to status quo bias,
diversify naively by dividing their contributions evenly among the options oered, and
appear to naively extrapolate past return performance.
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III Asset Pricing Theories Based on Investor Psy-
chology
The evidence in the preceding section presents challenging puzzles to be explained.
Some pioneering models captured imperfect rationality in asset markets by including
mechanistic traders who either make pure noise trades, or positive feedback trades in
which new purchases are an increasing function of past price moves.
82
This was an
eÆcient way to illustrate some crucial insights about survival, arbitrage, and pricing.
However, in full generality, the mechanistic modelling approach is very elastic. If noise
trades can be arbitrarily correlated with other economic variables, any return pattern
can be explained. The economic content of mechanistic trader models comes from the
choice of assumptions on trades to reect facts about psychology or trading. In the
hope of being more accurately predictive, recent research has explicitly modelled how
decisionmaking occurs in a way that reects psychological biases.
In a specic investment setting, it can be hard to judge which documented psycho-
logical bias is relevant. This creates an extra degree of freedom for model-mining not
present in the purely rational approach. Thus, even more than for purely rational theo-
ries, a psychological theory becomes more persuasive if it explains a range of empirical
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See Odean (1999), Barber and Odean (2000b, 2000a).
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See Bloomeld, Libby, and Nelson (2000), Bloomeld et al (2001).
81
See Benartzi (1997), Benartzi and Thaler (2001), and Madrian and Shea (2000).
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See Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), DeLong et al (1990a, 1990b), and Frankel and
Froot (1986, 1990).
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patterns in dierent contexts, and generates new implications.
The next subsection starts with models of the simple statics of mispricing and cor-
rection. Models of dynamics follow in Subsection III.2. A static setting can address how
risk and mispricing determine the cross-section of expected returns. Mispricing proxies
capture long-term misvaluation and correction. Models of dynamics can describe in-
tertemporal patterns, such as a shift from underreacting to overreacting to a stream of
news, or a pattern of overreacting and then overreacting even more. Thus, dynamic anal-
yses can address patterns of short- versus long-term return autocorrelations. Subsection
III.3 discusses how to empirically distinguish psychology-based pricing theories.
III.1 Static Asset Pricing
I consider static models based upon either limited attention/participation, or overcon-
dence. Merton (1987) analyzed the cross-section of security returns in a static asset
pricing model with exogenous non-participation. Such non-participation can be viewed
as reecting limited attention, preference for the familiar, and salience eects. The
key implication of the model is that neglected stocks earn abnormally high expected
returns.
Some recent static analyses of psychology and security returns are based on investor
overcondence. Financial analysts and investors dier in their skill at acquiring informa-
tion through means such as interviewing management, analyzing nancial statements,
and internet chat. An investor who overestimates his ability to do so will underestimate
his errors in forecasting value. Thus, as in Kyle and Wang (1997), in these models an
overcondent investor overestimates the precision of his information signals.
Odean (1998b) studies the statics of overcondence when there is a single risky
security. When price-taking investors think the signal is more accurate than it really
is, the market price overreacts to the to the signal. Eventually, when the true state of
the world resolves, the price corrects. This pattern of overreaction and reversal causes
excess price volatility, and negative long run return autocorrelation.
Instead of a general tendency to overestimate signal precision, in Daniel, Hirshleifer,
and Subrahmanyam (1998), investors are only overcondent about private information
signals. This reects the notion that an investor's self-esteem is tied to his own ability
to acquire useful information. Individuals receive a private signal, and subsequently
update based on an inconclusive public signal. In the static version of the model, investor
condence is xed. Managers may selectively undertake good news activities such as
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a stock split or repurchase at least partly in response to market undervaluation of the
rm, and other activities such as new issue when the the rm is overvalued.
Since investors overreact to private signals, returns on private information arrival
dates tend to reverse. In contrast, for selective public events, the model implies post-
event continuation of stock returns: selective events associated with positive (negative)
average event-date reactions are also associated with positive (negative) average post-
event long-run abnormal returns. Intuitively, when the rm (or another party) takes a
public action in opposition to overcondent mispricing, the market corrects only partially
in the short run.
In a model with multiple securities, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001a)
provide an analog to the CAPM when investors are overcondent. Security terminal
cash ows satisfy a linear factor model, and each investor observes signals about the
factors and the idiosyncratic component of security payos. Risk-averse investors form
what they perceive to be mean-variance eÆcient portfolios. Overcondent individuals
trade with risk averse arbitrageurs who form rational beliefs. A security's equilibrium
expected return is linearly increasing in the security's beta with the market, and the
security's current mispricing. Variables containing market price are proxies for the se-
curity's misvaluation. For example, a fundamental/price ratio such as book/market is
driven down when favorable news drives a stock up. Since there is overreaction, this is
when the stock is overvalued. Thus, a high fundamental/price ratio predicts high future
returns. Aggregate value measures such as the market dividend yield or book/market
positively predict future market returns.
A fundamental/price ratio (e.g., high book/market) tends to be high if either risk is
high or if the market has overreacted to a highly adverse signal. In either case, price on
average rises. Since high book/market reects both mispricing and risk, whereas beta
reects only risk, book/market tends to be a better predictor of returns. These two
sources of predictive power are unequal. Beta helps disentangle these cases, so beta and
book/market are joint predictors of future returns.
However, when overcondence becomes very strong, and if the proxy for the un-
conditional expected value (e.g., book value) is perfect, then the incremental ability of
beta to predict future returns vanishes. The fundamental/price ratio dominates beta
even though risk is priced. This is an extreme case, but it helps explain why empir-
ical ndings on the incremental eect of beta have been weak and inconsistent. The
model also implies that in univariate regressions beta should predict future returns. The
model further describes the tradeos in constructing optimal price-related proxies for
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misvaluation.
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001b) extend the DHS2 model to examine
regressions of future returns on both book/market and HML loadings (Subsection II.1.2).
They nd that in an imperfectly rational model either characteristics (e.g., book/market)
or covariances (e.g., HML loadings) can be stronger predictors of future returns.
III.2 Dynamic Asset Pricing
Static models provide simple generalizations of the insights of the CAPM that can
encompass the eect of risk as well as mispricing. However, a static approach has
no hope of capturing the distinction between short-term continuation and long-term
reversals. In both static and dynamic models, long-run reversal occurs when there is an
overreaction to an impulse such as the arrival of good news. In a dynamic setting, short-
run positive autocorrelation is consistent with long-run reversal so long as the process of
overreaction and correction is suÆciently smooth. Such smoothness implies that when
an impulse sets price rising, it will probably rise some more; that on average the last
up-move to the peak of the impulse response function is not followed by a precipitous
drop; and when the price is falling, it tends to fall some more. In contrast, a long-
lag autocorrelation tends to associate positive returns during the overreaction process
with negative returns arising during the correction process. The subsections that follow
describes the eects of pure (independent) noise trading, mechanistic models based on
correlated trading (positive feedback), the eects of mistaken beliefs, and the eects of
alternative preferences.
III.2.1 Pure Noise Trading
Pure noise trading and positive feedback trading cause overreaction, and hence negative
autocorrelations in long-run returns. When a stock rises too high, it needs to correct back
down. Equivalently, this overreaction causes excess volatility in returns. Furthermore,
Campbell and Kyle (1993) showed that overreaction can cause aggregate stock market
value measures such as dividend yield to predict future market returns, so that contrarian
investment strategies are on average protable.
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990a) (hencefore, DSSW1) model the
consequences of unpredictable random trades. Two securities pay identical, riskless
dividends. The price of one asset is exogenously xed. The other asset is risky because
pure noise trades cause stochastic mispricing. Rational arbitrageurs with exogenous
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short time horizons limit their arbitrage trades for fear that the mispricing will get
worse before it gets better. On average the risky asset trades at a discount, the risk
premium demanded by the rational investors.
The noise trading approach provides an explanation for the existence and behavior
of closed-end fund discounts and their correlations with stock returns. According to
DSSW1, noise traders buy and sell closed-end funds in a correlated fashion, causing
discounts or premia relative to net asset value to uctuate. The mispricing risk this
creates makes these funds less attractive to rational investors, so on average there is a
discount. This theory implies that fund discounts move together based on a systematic
noise-trading factor; such comovement exists (e.g., Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)).
The theory also explains why such funds are created: to exploit optimistic noise traders.
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) suggest that shifts in fund discounts reect shifts
in noise trader sentiment toward all small stocks. This is consistent with their evidence
that narrowing of closed-end fund discounts is associated contemporaneously with high
small stock returns. This implies that discounts predict small stock returns (see Section
II). If discounts were a consequence of pure noise trading, they would be uncorrelated
with future fundamentals such as as accounting performance. Swaminathan (1996) nds
that at lags of greater than one year high discounts predict both low future accounting
prots and high future stock returns. This is consistent with fund investors overreacting
to genuine information.
The comovement in small stock returns documented in Fama and French (1993)
may come from correlated imperfectly rational trades (see Shleifer (2000), p.20). The
DSSW1 approach then suggests that small stocks, including closed-end fund shares, will
earn high expected returns in compensation for their high mispricing risk. Alternatively,
low market-value stocks may earn high returns because a stock's low market value on
average derives partly from its being undervalued (see, e.g., Daniel, Hirshleifer, and
Subrahmanyam (2001a)). The U.S. small rm eect has been weak or absent in the last
15 years, yet closed-end fund discounts remain.
III.2.2 Positive Feedback Trading
Positive feedback trading has several possible motivations, one being that investors form
expectations of future prices by extrapolating trends (a topic covered in the next subsub-
section). DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990b) (DSSW2) oer a model
with a risky asset and riskfree cash, in which information arrives sequentially. The
exogenous date 2 demand of the positive feedback traders is linearly increasing in the
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preceding price trend. Forseeing this, rational speculators buy into price trends, exag-
gerating trends and overshooting. As a result there is excess volatility, and long-term
negative autocorrelations in returns.
In Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), there are two types of imperfectly rational
traders, positive feedback traders, and fundamental traders who ignore price and trade
based upon a signal about the security's payo. Some fundamental traders observe
this signal with a lag. This lag creates price trends which are protably exploited
by feedback traders. The gradual process of overshooting and correction induces both
short-lag positive autocorrelation and long-lag negative autocorrelation.
More recent models with endogenous decisions have found things akin to pure noise
trading| a limiting case of overcondence, and positive feedback trading. But endoge-
nously derived positive feedback is conditional and statistical, which seems more realistic
than the older models. For reasons of both descriptiveness and predictiveness, explicit
modelling of the psychology of investors is likely to supersede the mechanistic approach
(except perhaps in otherwise-intractable applications).
III.2.3 Mistaken Beliefs
One explanation for return predictability is that investors set prices based on mistaken
expectations.
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This subsection rst considers dynamics when irrational individuals
share the same biases (either overcondence, or representativeness and conservatism). I
then consider the interaction of multiple trader types with dierent biases.
The Dynamics of Biased Attribution and Overcondence
Two recent papers provide models with a single risky security that reect the fact
that people learn about their own abilities in a biased, self-promoting fashion. In these
models, investors do not know the precision of their private information signals, which
reects their information-gathering ability. They learn about their precision through
time by observing whether later public news conrms or disconrms their previous signal.
The analyses assume the dynamic complement of overcondence, biased self-attribution.
When an investor receives conrming news his condence in his precision rises too much,
and when there is disconrming news his condence declines too little.
In Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998), the impulse response function to a
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Shefrin and Statman (1994) analyze the general eect of mistaken beliefs on equilibrium prices
in securities markets. They predict that when prices are ineÆcient, mispricing is related to a `beta
correction;' it has not been obvious how to test this.
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favorable initial shock, the private information signal, is hump-shaped. Price on average
rises further as public information arrives, because condence about the private signal
on average grows. Eventually, however, accumulating evidence forces investors back to
a more reasonable self-perception. This smooth hump-shaped impulse response implies
positive short-lag and negative long-lag return autocorrelations. DHSI also numerically
simulate the correlation of a public information suprise (such as favorable accounting
performance) with future returns with self-attribution bias. At short lags this correlation
is positive, but at long lags the correlation can be negative (see Section II.1.4).
Gervais and Odean (2001) provide a model that accommodates analytical solution
for the learning process under biased self-attribution. As traders become overcondent
trading volume and market return volatility increase. Since equity is in positive net
supply, the model also predicts that trading volume will be higher after market rises
than market falls, consistent with Statman and Thorley (1998).
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The Dynamics of Representativeness and Conservatism
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (BSV) oer an explanation for under- and over-
reactions based on a model in which actual earnings for a risky asset follow a random
walk, but investors do not understand this. They mistakenly believe that the earnings
process stochastically uctuates between a regime with mean-reverting earnings, and a
regime with expected earnings growth.
If recent earnings changes reverse, investors erroneously believe the rm is in a mean-
reverting state, and underreact to recent news, consistent with conservatism (Section
I.1.4). If investors see a sequence of growing earnings, they tend to conclude (wrongly)
that the rm is in a growth regime, and overextrapolate trends, which is arguably
reminiscent of representativeness (Section I.1.3). Overreaction to a long enough trend
implies subsequent low returns during the process of correction. Thus, there can be long-
term overreaction and correction, implying negative long-lag return autocorrelation. Yet
the average response to an initial impulse can be smooth, implying positive short lag
autocorrelation. Similarly, the model can accomodate a positive short-term correlation
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The implication of attribution/overcondence models for whether there should be something akin
to a disposition eect (holding winners, selling losers) is not obvious. When a stock is rst becoming
a winner, rational arbitrageurs who foresee further price rises should drive the price up even higher
than the overcondent think is justied. This encourages the overcondent to sell, consistent with the
disposition eect. However, for a stock that has been a winner for some time, the arbitrageurs will sell
to the overcondent as the price peaks. Other recent models of momentum and reversal have similar
opposing eects.
38
between the asset return and an earnings change, and a negative long-term correlation. If
sporadic events such as dividend initiations are viewed as isolated from earnings patterns,
a single-event version of the model applies implies, under appropriate parameter values,
underreaction.
Cross-sectional eects (such as a value eect) are simulated with earnings that are
independently distributed across stocks. This implies a nearly riskfree arbitrage oppor-
tunity for a rational investor who buys and sells stocks based on return predictors. Such
arbitrage would be risky in a setting where investors update their beliefs about system-
atic factors in earnings trends or reversals. The psychological literature on multiple cue
learning (Section I.1) may provide guidance for such a model.
Interactions among Traders with Dierent Biases
Hong and Stein (1999) (HS) analyze a market in which, as in Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers (1990), some traders react sluggishly, and others trade based on positive feed-
back. Each group of traders is risk averse, and is able to process only a subset of available
information. Information about the liquidating dividend dribbles into the hands of dif-
ferent groups of newswatchers. Newswatchers condition on their own private signals but
ignore market prices, causing underreaction.
Momentum traders, in contrast, condition on the cumulative price change over the
last k periods. Each trader takes a xed position for a given number of periods. Mo-
mentum traders exploit the underreaction of newswatchers by buying in response to
price increases. This accelerates the reaction to news, but also causes overshooting.
The smoothness of the overreaction process causes positive short-lag and negative long-
lag autocorrelation. Slower information diusion tends to launch a more powerful an
overreaction, leading to more negative long-lag autocorrelations.
Other Errors in the Dynamics of Beliefs
Although it is impossible to be comprehensive, I briey mention some other ap-
proaches to the dynamics of beliefs.
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Shefrin (1997) discusses how base rate under-
weighting may shed light on the anomalous behavior of implied volatilities in options
markets. Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (1999) model the equity premium puzzle and re-
lated issues as arising from a combination of errors, including underestimation of the
85
Kurz (1997) describes his theory of endogenous uncertainty and rational belief equilibrium, which
focuses on sets of beliefs that cannot be reliably contradicted by existing data. However, Bayesian
updating has greater appeal as a theory of rational decisions.
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persistence of high versus low consumption growth regimes. They describe a rule-of-
thumb calculation method that lead to such errors, but do not address whether other
rule-of-thumb methods would imply the opposite error.
Informal arguments about money illusion aecting prices have been oered by several
authors.
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Investors subject to money illusion may discount real cash ows at nominal
interest rates, causing overdiscounting during high-ination (growing ination?) periods.
They also may fail to take into account that higher ination reduces the real value of a
rm's debt. Ritter and Warr (2001) provide evidence suggesting that ination illusion
contributed to the 1982-99 bull market.
III.2.4 Alternative Preferences
Psychological evidence does not support the traditional assumption of time-additive
expected utility. Theorists, often motivated more by puzzling securities price evidence
than by psychological evidence, have oered models based upon alternative preferences.
Alternative preference models can address the equity premium puzzle, the interest rate
puzzle and excess stock market volatility in at least two ways. First, by breaking the
link between risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, a high equity
risk premium (which demands high aversion to risk) can be reconciled with low interest
rates (which demand reasonably high intertemporal elasticity of substitution). Second,
by allowing risk aversion to vary stochastically, stock price volatility can be increased
relative to consumption variability.
Several papers address the equity premium and riskfree rate puzzles applying habit-
forming preferences.
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Constantinides (1990) showed that habit formation (Subsection
I.5) reconciles a high equity premium with realistic consumption smoothness and growth,
and moderate levels of risk aversion. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) and Chan and Ko-
gan (2000) nd that habit preferences that involve a Veblen-like concern for consumption
of others imply stochastic risk aversion, which can reconcile a variety of facts about rst
and second moments of returns and consumption.
Several papers apply aspects of prospect theory and rst-order risk averse prefer-
ences.
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Benartzi and Thaler (1995) consider investors who make a sequence of my-
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Fisher (1928), Modigliani and Cohn (1979), Ritter and Warr (2001), Sharpe (1999).
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See, e.g., Abel (1990), Boldrin, Christiano, and Fisher (1997), Campbell and Cochrane (1999),
Constantinides (1990), Ferson and Constantinides (1991), Heaton (1995), and Sundaresan (1989).
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See Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2000), Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001), Barberis and Huang (2000),
Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997a), Benartzi and Thaler (1995), Epstein and Zin (1990, 1991, 1993),
Gomes (2000), and Shumway (1998).
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opic single-period porfolio decisions. Consistent with loss-aversion, investors care about
changes in wealth or consumption relative to a reference point that shifts from decision
to decision, and their value function is kinked at the reference point. Investors therefore
are highly averse to risks of short term losses in stocks relative to bonds.
Shumway (1998) extends this approach to explain the cross-section of expected re-
turns as well as the market expected return. Consistent with prospect theory, he assumes
a modied power utility function that implies risk aversion over gains and risk seeking
over losses. The reference point is a zero market return. In consequence, small market
returns cause relatively large changes in the stochastic discount factor. In equilibrium
stock prices are a linear function of the stock's up-side beta and its down-side beta.
Empirically, Shumway nds that the model does quite well in tting both the equity
premium puzzle and the cross-section of security returns. He suggests that the high
premium on equity results from loss aversion, which causes marginal utility to vary
more with slightly negative market returns. This tends to magnify the eect of stocks'
downside risk relative to that of bonds.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001) (BHS) oer a model based on a combination of
loss aversion, and the `house money' eect of Thaler and Johnson (1990), the tendency
for individuals who have experienced recent gains to be less averse to risky gambles.
To capture loss aversion, they assume a piece-wise linear value function that is steeper
among losses than among gains relative to the reference point. After the good news
of a high dividend, individuals become more risk tolerant. Stochastic variation in risk
aversion increases the volatility of returns relative to dividends. These uctuations in
risk aversion tend to reverse, causing predictability in stock returns. The high return
variability raises the equity risk premium even without high aversion to consumption
risk, and is therefore consistent with a reasonably low riskfree rate.
Barberis and Huang (2000) (BH), like Shumway, examine the dynamics of loss aver-
sion with many risky securities. BH consider two kinds of mental accounting. Under
individual stock accounting, investors care about total consumption, but are also loss
averse over individual stock movements. In the other, portfolio accounting, individuals
are loss averse with respect to movements in their total stock portfolio.
Investors are also subject to the house money eect. Using plausible parameter
values, under individual stock accounting the typical individual stock has a high expected
excess return, and its returns are variable relative to dividend variability. The cross-
section of returns is predictable using measures of size, value, and whether the rm was
a winner or loser over the last three years. The model implies an even higher equity
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premium than BHS because investors are loss-averse with respect to the residual risk of
individual stock movements.
In a broadly similar spirit, Epstein and Zin (1993) examine a rst-order risk averse
setting and report that the case of disappointment averse preferences t the data well
(see also Epstein and Zin (1990)). Bekaert, Hodrick, and Marshall (1997a) nd that
rst-order risk aversion can explain predictability in U.S and Japan equity, bond and
foreign exchange markets better than the expected utility model, but not enough to
match the data. Ang, Bekaert, and Liu (2000) nd that a high U.S. equity premium is
consistent with reasonable parameters of disappointment averse preferences.
A rather dierent approach from applications of loss-averse or rst-order risk averse
preferences focuses on aversion to ambiguity (Subsection I.3.1) and a consequent taste for
robustness.
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A robust decision rule is one that does well in the face of model uncertainty
when Nature chooses the most adverse possible model in response to the individual's
choice. Tornell (2000) provides a model based on agents who choose robust forecasting
techniques to explain high equity returns, predictability and excess volatility.
Even slight stochastic shifts in preferences can substantially increase the volatility
of stock prices relative to the variability of consumption (Allen and Gale (1994), Kraus
and Sagi (2000), and Mehra and Sah (2000)). The psychological evidence that visceral
factors aect decisions are consistent with such variability.
III.2.5 Evolving Populations
A promising eld for exploration uses evolutionary simulation of the interactions of
agents in nancial markets. In the last ve years, physicists have begun to do research on
nancial markets, some calling their eld econophysics (see Farmer (1999)). Some of the
recent models by physicists make such radical mechanistic assumptions about investor
behavior and market structure that the resulting insights seem unlikely to generalize.
Fortunately, a very promising strand of evolutionary literature explores the populations
of traders who are imperfectly rational but do learn and make endogenous decisions.
Freed from the constraints of analytical tractability, modellers are able to explore a
wider space of economic settings.
An evolutionary approach could address the argument that even though individuals
are imperfectly rational, as they learn from their trading outcomes the system will
progress toward the fully rational equilibrium rapidly. I conjecture that a simple tropism
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among traders towards actions that generate higher investment prots will not converge
to the ICAPM quickly. Even with a long history of evidence, it is hard for a trader
to gure out whether a trading strategy has done well after adjusting for risk unless he
understands risk, and the income and substitution eects of Merton ICAPM hedging are,
I conjecture, too subtle for most individual or even sophisticated institutional investors.
Some brief recent surveys of the computational eld include Farmer (1999), Farmer
and Lo (1999) and LeBaron (2000a). Some recent nding are that long-horizon investors
frequently do not drive shorter-horizon investors out of nancial markets, and that pop-
ulations of long- and short- horizon agents can create patterns of volatility and volume
similar to actual empirical patterns (Lebaron (2000b, 2000c)).
III.3 Empirically Distinguishing Pricing Theories
The eects described in dierent psychological pricing theories need not be mutually
exclusive, but it is useful to examine how their predictions dier. My focus is on value,
momentum, and event-based eects.
III.3.1 Distinguishing Explanations for Size and Value Eects
Several past authors have pointed out that long-run overreaction will induce cross-
sectional value eects. Two recent models derive cross-sectional value and size eects
when securities are subject to systematic and idiosyncratic inuences (Barberis and
Huang (2000) (BH), and Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001a) (DSH2)).
DHS2 provides no help in explaining the equity premium puzzle. The BH theory does
address the equity premium and associated puzzles, because people who do individual-
stock accounting are averse to the high residual risk of stocks. Thus, a further implication
of BH is that residual risk is cross-sectionally priced (Brennan (2001)). Furthermore,
in contrast with the Merton (1987) limited participation theory, the BH theory seems
to imply that, ceteris paribus, greater participation by individual investors will increase
the premium for residual risk.
DHS2 oer further implications, largely untested, concerning the cross-sectional dis-
persion in fundamental/price ratios, and the ability of current volume to predict future
return volatility. Another implication is that as condence exogenously varies over time,
the dispersion in security fundamental/price ratios varies together with the ability of
such ratios to predict future returns. Cohen, Polk, and Vuolteenaho (2000) conrm such
a relationship between the book/market `value spread' and the protability of value
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trading strategies.
In DHS2 mispricing is present in a small number of factors. The importance of
idiosyncratic eects in the BH theory suggests that rational arbitrageurs should take
strong contrarian positions and earn large expected prots. More broadly, the strong
ow of wealth in the BH theory suggests that value eects should be more transitory than
in DHS2. BH also point out that the rise of mutual and pension fund stock investment
should have led to less individual stock accounting, and is therefore consistent with a
weakening in size and value eects.
There is psychological evidence that overcondence is strongest when information
signals are less precise and when feedback is inconclusive (e.g., Einhorn (1980), Grif-
n and Tversky (1992)). Thus, DHS2 predicts that fundamental/price ratios should
forecast risk-adjusted returns more strongly for businesses that are hard to value (e.g.,
R&D-intensive rms comprised largely of intangible assets). Chan, Lakonishok, and
Sougiannis (1999) subsequently reported evidence consistent with such a pattern.
Neither BH nor DHS2 capture momentum. The absence of a unied model that
directly captures the two most conspicuous cross-sectional eects, value and momentum,
is an obvious gap in the literature. The results of DHS1 and of Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998) suggest that unied explanations may be possible based upon either
overcondence, or upon misperceptions of regime-shifting.
III.3.2 Distinguishing Explanations for Post-Event Continuation
The DHS1 analysis of post-event continuation diers from the BSV model in predicting
continuation only for selective events taken by a party such as management or an analyst
in response to market mispricing. The support for this from one type of event (see Sub-
section II.1.4 at footnote 62) is intriguing. Event studies on other low-discretion events
(such as regulatory announcements, input supply shocks or output demand shocks) pro-
vide an attractive direction for further testing.
The BSV model is based on public information. The DHS1 model implies nega-
tive long-run return autocorrelation associated with private information arrival. This
is consistent with evidence of Daniel and Titman (2000). DHS1 further predicts that
post-event continuation will be strongest in stocks about which investors have poor in-
formation (often illiquid or smaller stocks). DHS1 also oers several untested predictions
about about the occurrence of and price patterns around corporate events, and about
volatility at the time of private versus public signals.
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III.3.3 Distinguishing Explanations for Momentum and Reversal
Analytically, the three recent models of how mistaken beliefs cause momentum and
reversals (Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) or BSV; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Sub-
rahmanyam (1998) or DHS1; and Hong and Stein (1999) or HS) all generate an impulse
response function to a new information signal in which there is a gradual rise in the
average reaction to a positive signal and a gradual average process of correction.
In all these models, the misperceptions that drive momentum are also the drivers of
long-term reversal. These models therefore imply that those sets of stocks with largest
momentum eects should also have the largest reversal eects. So it is interesting that
much of the empirical evidence of return predictability, including both momentum and
reversal, is stronger in small rms (see Fama (1998) and Loughran and Ritter (2000)).
More generally, greater uncertainty about a set of stocks, and a lack of accurate
feedback about their fundamentals, leaves more room for psychological biases. At the
extreme, it is relatively hard to misperceive an asset that is nearly riskfree. Thus, the
misvaluation eects of almost any mistaken-beliefs model should be strongest among
rms about which there is high uncertainty/poor information (cash ow variance is
one possible proxy). Furthermore, in DHS1 and HS, greater information asymmetry
strengthens the predicted eects; the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread
is a possible proxy. BSV does not have implications based on information asymmetry.
Firm size, analyst following, and dispersion in analyst forecasts are potential proxies for
information asymmetry, but they also may proxy for mere uncertainty. Thus, evidence
that small rms (internationally) and rms with low analyst following have greater
momentum is consistent with, but does not sharply distinguish, the three models.
BSV predict overreaction to trends, which can also occur in DHS1, but it is not
obvious that the DHS1 implication extends to zero net supply securities. Thus, the
evidence of Poteshman (2000) of daily underreaction and multiple-day overreaction of
option prices to shifts in volatility supports BSV (at a very dierent time horizon).
Bloomeld and Hales (2001) directly test the BSV theory that people misperceive
random walks to be shifts between continuation and reversal regimes by examining
predictions by MBA-student experimental subjects. Consistent with BSV, subjects
overreacted to changes preceded by sequences of continuations, and underreacted to
changes preceded by many reversals. However, people on average tended to expect re-
versal, whereas a perceived tilt toward continuation is needed to obtain post-earnings
announcement drift and post-event return continuation.
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Another testing approach is to nd datasets in which the trades of irrational traders
versus rational arbitrageurs can be identied.
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Coval and Shumway (2000) analyze a
rich database to describe how the positions of futures market-makers changes following
recent trading success. Another suggestion has been to view market orders as irra-
tional and limit orders as rational (Hvidkjaer (2000)). However, it does not seem clear
why this would be the case based on these theories, and empirically it is limit order
traders who lose money (Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)). Further progress
on microstructure testing of these models calls for explicit modelling of psychology and
microstructure.
IV Conclusion
Man is neither innite in faculties, nor in apprehension like a god. Nor is human fallibility
shed at the doorstep of the stock exchange. Psychology-based asset pricing theory has
promise of capturing this reality, though at this point we are at an early stage.
Financial economists have grown more receptive to entertaining psychological expla-
nations. One sign of this is the popularity of utility functions that seem to violate time
consistency or the rationality axioms of expected utility in recent literature on the equity
premium and riskfree rate puzzles. Some of these preferences could be endogenized as
reduced form summaries of rational settings with market frictions, but this does not
seem to be a high research priority even among fans of the full-rationality approach.
In Section I I tried to give some hint of the wealth of psychological ndings, many
utterly unexploited, that can inform nancial modelling. In Subsection III.3.2 I oered
hints for empirical work to distinguish alternative psychology-based pricing theories. I
now mention a few other possible theoretical and empirical directions.
1. So far few psychology-based asset pricing models allow for both risk aversion and
multiple risky securities. It will be useful to explore the dynamics of mistaken
beliefs when there is a cross-section of securities, to address such issues as volume
as a predictor of returns, and the eects of dierent rates of overreaction and
correction for factors and residuals.
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Conjecturally, the DHS approach implies that rational arbitrageurs buy after a price increase (fore-
seeing further overreaction). Overcondent traders sell (as implied by market-clearing; because the arbs
drive prices up even higher than justied based on current overcondent beliefs). Some period of time
after the favorable impulse, the arbs tend to sell out to the overcondent, and to go short. Anticipation
by arbs of overreaction should generate similar trading patterns in BSV; in the HS setting the behavior
of irrational traders is more complex.
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2. Pricing models based on loss- and disappointment aversion can be viewed as re-
ecting a concern about future feelings. But more directly, the eect of currently-
experienced emotions on current prices merits analysis.
3. It is often not obvious how to translate pre-existing evidence from psychological
experiments into assumptions about investors in real nancial settings. Routine
experimental testing of the assumptions and conclusions of asset pricing theories
is needed to guide modelling.
4. We lack a quantied set of capital budgeting and risk management procedures that
reect mispricing and are ready for practitioners to apply (but see Stein (1996)).
5. The great missing chapter in asset pricing theory, I believe, is a model of the social
process by which people form and transmit ideas about markets and securities. In
addition to studying what inuences individuals' valuations, an appealing direction
is to study how attention is focused on certain groups of stocks, and the eects
of resulting swings in participation. A dierent empirical direction is to analyze
the specic content of widespread, erroneous investor theories to identify ways of
predicting returns. Robert Shiller has discussed and documented investor theories,
belief transmission, and eects on pricing (e.g., Shiller (1984, 1990, 2000c); see also
the analysis of DeMarzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2000)). This research has blazed
a path upon which further work will follow.
My list of further directions is necessarily idiosyncratic. In an area that is just
coming of age, many new prospects are open. This is an exciting time for the eld of
asset pricing.
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Table 1: Common Objections to the Psychological Approach to Asset Pricing
and Parallel Objections to the Fully Rational Approach
Objection to Psychological Approach Objection to Fully Rational Approach
Alleged psychological biases are
arbitrary.
Rationality in nance theory
requires impossible powers of
calculation.
Experiments that generate al-
leged psychological biases are not
meaningful.
The evidence we possess does not
support rational behavior.
It is too easy to go theory shing
for psychological biases to match
data ex post.
It is too easy to go theory sh-
ing for factor structures and mar-
ket imperfections to match data
ex post.
Rational traders should arbitrage
away mispricing
Irrational traders should arbi-
trage away eÆcient pricing
Rational investors will make bet-
ter decisions and get richer.
Irrational investors will bear more
risk and get richer.
Confused investors will learn their
way to good decisions.
Accurate investors will learn their
way to bad decisions.
Apparent return predictability is
spurious, so psychological models
of predictability are misguided.
Apparent return predictability is
spurious, so rational models of
predictability are misguided.
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